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ARTI CLE
FOOL ME ONCE, SHAME ON YOU; FOOL ME
TWICE, SHAME ON YOU AGAIN: HOW
DISPARATE TREATMENT DOCTRINE
PERPETUATES RACIAL HIERARCHY
David Simson"
ABSTRACT

Title VII race discrimination doctrine is excessively hostile to
workers of color, and many observers agree that it needs to be
fixed. Yet comparatively few analyses of the doctrine weave
together doctrinal and theoretical insights with systematic
empirical findings from social science. This Article looks to Social
Dominance Theory-a social psychology theory with a robust body
of supporting empirical research-to take on this task and connect
judicial interpretation of Title VII to the human tendency to create
and maintain group-based hierarchies. In doing so, the Article
questions the common view that Title VII race discrimination
doctrine is symmetrical, protecting all racial groups equally except
for those instances, most notably affirmative action, that are said
to create limited preferences in favor of workers of color. Viewed
through the proper lens, this view is not supported. Digging deep
into the doctrinal logic and applying empirical research findings
on how human psychology operates when group hierarchy is at
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stake, this Article shows how Title VII disparate treatment
doctrine should instead be viewed as fundamentally asymmetrical
to the detriment of workers of color. As a result, the doctrine helps
perpetuate the racial hierarchy that continues to pervade the
American economy. Taking a hierarchy-centered view also helps
us uncover negative consequences that may result from various
law reform proposals that have been suggested to fix the disparate
treatment mess. This Article provides initial suggestions for what
reform grounded in one of Title VII's main asserted purposes-to
eliminate racial hierarchy in the workplace-could look like
instead, from reevaluating previous doctrinal choices to more
structural changes such as broadening the pipeline into the federal
judiciary. If we are to move towards a more racially egalitarian
society, we must be conscious of, and challenge, the human
tendency to perpetuate group-based hierarchy and its problematic
influence on the law.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

INTRODUCTION ........................................................... 1035

II. A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ............................. 1047
1047
A. An Overview of Social Dominance Theory .........
1. Basic ConceptualStructure ........................ 1047
1051
2. A CloserLook at Legitimizing Ideologies....
3. Sorting People into the Hierarchy............... 1053
4. SDT, the Law, and JudicialInterpretation1055
5. Important Contributionsof SDT ................ 1062
Critiqueand Baseline Errors.......... 1067
Framework
B.
Ill. DISPARATE TREATMENT DOCTRINE ASYMMETRICALLY
DISFAVORS WORKERS OF COLOR AND HELPS
MAINTAIN RACIAL HIERARCHY ................................... 1071

1072
A DisparateTreatment DoctrineBackground.......
B. Asymmetry Examples ......................................... 1076
1. Example 1: The PrimaFacie Case and
' Background Circumstances"..................... 1076
2. Example 2: Employee and Employer
Burdens After the PrimaFacie Case........... 1085
1092
3. Example 3: Affirmative Action Doctrine.....
IV. THINKING ABOUT SOLUTIONS .................................... 1104
V.

CONCLUSION ............................................................... 1111

2019

FOOLME ONCE
I.

1035

INTRODUCTION

Calling social dominance by more palatable names,
pretending that it is only a feature of other people's societies,
assuming that it is due only to the actions of a "misguided"
few, and presuming that it is merely a dying legacy of the
past not only are exercises in self-delusion, but also
contribute to the tenacity of group dominance by obfuscating
its very, existence, and thereby making it that much more
difficult to change.
We judge it as considerably more harmful to the cause of
equality and the fulfillment of democratic ideals to pay too
little than too much attention to the dynamics of group
dominance.'
Imagine that you are a black employee who is vying for a
promotion. 2 You have worked hard trying to rise through the
ranks. You have assiduously applied for more attractive jobs, but
you have been out of luck for a promotion because those jobs were
at other facilities, and the employer has a policy of filling vacancies
from within the same facility where possible. But now, a position
has opened up in your facility, and it needs to be filled quickly. You
think it is finally your turn: you are the only person on the
candidate list who is already working at the facility, and you are
clearly qualified. If everything goes by the book, you have finally
earned yourself a promotion. You are also the only black applicant
for the job.
But you don't get the job. Instead, you learn, a white male got
the job. What's more, the person who got the job was not on the
initial candidate list. He was not even qualified, and thus not
eligible, for the job based on the original job description. Yet, you
learn that, after finding out that you would have gotten the job
under existing procedures, the hiring manager ordered the job
description to be rewritten. Magically, the other candidate is now
the only person remaining on the new eligibility list and will be
hired. You are frustrated, upset. You can't help but think that your
race was the reason that you did not get the promotion. You know
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits race discrimination
in employment decisions. Surely, you think, if Title VII was
written to protect anyone, it would be you. Fool me once: you are
wrong. The district court judge agrees with you that you were more
qualified. However, the court tells you that it was not your race
1.
JIM SiDANIuS & FELiCIA PRATTO, SoCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY
OF SOCIAL HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION 309 (1999).
2.
The following description is taken from the facts of Foster v. Dalton, 71 F.3d 52
(1st Cir. 1995).
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that caused you not to get the promotion; it was that the manager
engaged in favoritism for his 'fishing buddy"-favoritism
ostensibly unconnected from any racial motivation. That is a
decision that the employer can legally make because favoritism
unconnected to race is not illegal. So, you lose your case. You are
confused. At trial, the manager had steadfastly denied any
favoritism, so you think he should be held to his testimony under
oath. But the district court didn't believe those denials and
concluded that favoritism is the better explanation for what
happened. You hope that the appeals court will correct what seems
like a clear error. Your hope is misplaced. While the court tells you
that it is troubled and might have reached a different conclusion
on a clean slate, it also says that it is bound by what it sees as
acceptable judgment calls by the district court in interpreting the
evidence. '"Title VII does not have a limitless remedial reach," the
3
court says, and you are not within its existing reach.
Now imagine that you are a black employee of an employer in
financial distress, hoping not to get laid off.4 You are somewhat
hopeful. You are the only black employee in an administrative
position, and your employer has committed itself to racial equity,
inclusion, and diversity through an affirmative action plan that
aims to achieve and protect an equitable racial composition of its
workforce. But the financial situation is bad. The employer must
lay off numerous people in your job category. You are initially one
of them, but like all of the laid-off employees, you get a hearing to
contest your layoff. After further review, the employer decides that
your layoff would improperly set back its goals of racial equality
in the workforce and decides to retain you after all. A white
employee, who was in some respects senior to you but was laid off,
sues, claiming that the decision to retain you but not her was
illegal race discrimination under Title VII. Surely, you think, it
must be possible for an employer to voluntarily try to retain its
only black administrative employee in an effort to have a more
racially equitable workforce. Fool me twice: you are wrong again.
The court decides that retaining you is not a decision that your
employer can legally make under Title VII. The employer could
only do so if it had discriminated against black employees in the
3.
See Foster, 71 F.3d at 56; see also Neal v. Roche, 349 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir.
2003) (noting case law holding "that an employer's actions based on loyalty to a friend or
relative (particularly an unemployed friend or relative) are not considered 'discriminatory,'
even where they benefit the nonprotected friend or relative at the expense of a more
qualified, protected person").

4.

The following description is taken from the facts of Cunico v. Pueblo Sch. Dist.

No. 60, 917 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1990).
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past, and there was not enough evidence of that. For the court,
because there are few blacks in the local labor force, it really
wouldn't be significant for the employer to have no black
employees at all. What's more, retaining you to protect the
employer's affirmative action progress was illegal because it
"unnecessarily trammel[ed]" the interests of the white employee,
who the court viewed as the one who was really entitled to your
position. 5
Imagining yourself as the worker in the first scenario above
puts you into the shoes of one of the most common types of litigants
in the American civil justice system. Employment discrimination
cases are consistently among the most frequently litigated types
of civil cases in the federal courts.6 By imagining your frustration
about not receiving any relief, you also share in the feeling most
commonly experienced by plaintiffs in these cases. Employment
7
discrimination cases are notoriously difficult to win for plaintiffs.
Employment discrimination plaintiffs fare more poorly than other
civil plaintiffs in the district courts,8 and even if they succeed at
the trial court level, they are extremely likely to have their
victories overturned on appeal. 9 This pattern appears to have been
in place for decades now.' 0 Claims of race discrimination are
perhaps the most frequently litigated type of employment
discrimination case,'1 and there are some indications that race

5.
Id. at 440 (quoting Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 617 (1987)).
6.
See, e.g., 1 BARBARA T. LINDEMANN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
1-1 n.1 (5th ed. 2012) (noting that data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
in the year 2011 shows that "[t]he only statutory category of civil litigation that produces a
greater volume of cases is habeas corpus petitions").
7.
See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment
DiscriminationPlaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV.
103 (2009); see also Michael Sehni, Why Are Employment DiscriminationCases So Hardto
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 558-61 (2001).
8.
See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, supra note 7, at 127 (noting that "[t]he most
significant observation about the district courts' adjudication of employment discrimination
cases is the long-run lack of success for these plaintiffs relative to other plaintiffs").
9.
See, e.g., id at 111-12 (noting that the "spread between defendants' and plaintiffs'
reversal rates in jobs cases is more extreme than the spread in non-jobs cases, with jobs
defendants doing better and jobs plaintiffs doing worse than their non-jobs counterparts").
10.
See, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, That's Not Discrimination:American Beliefs and the
Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1287 (2012) (noting that
"discrimination litigants have encountered difficult odds since at least the late 1970s (when
comprehensive data [was] first available)").
11.
See, e.g., ELLEN BERREY ET AL., RIGHTS ON TRIAL: How WORKPLACE
DISCRIMINATION LAW PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 54-56 (2017) (discussing how, in a
randomly selected sample of over 1,700 employment discrimination cases, race
discrimination cases were the most commonly filed type, accounting for forty percent of all
cases).
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discrimination plaintiffs fare particularly poorly in the courts. 12
Racial minorities, in particular black plaintiffs, are the
prototypical plaintiff in such cases. Black plaintiffs bring most
13
employment discrimination cases claiming race discrimination.
Thus, the apparent antiplaintiff bias of federal judges in
employment discrimination cases' 4 disproportionately affects
black plaintiffs, who lose most of their cases. 15 This is so even
though a wide variety of data shows that racial inequality and
racial discrimination against workers of color continue to pervade
the American economy.' 6 In the face of such continued
discrimination, one might think that employment discrimination
law should be equally, perhaps more, hospitable to claims by
workers of color compared to other kinds of civil plaintiffs, not less.
Yet, it is decidedly not.
The shape of employment discrimination doctrine under Title

12.
This historical lack of success has led at least one scholar to claim that federal
courts have an "anti-race plaintiff ideology." See Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race
Discriminationin Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 931-33 (2006); see also Selmi,
supra note 7, at 562 (noting that "[r]ace discrimination claims are generally thought to be
the most difficult employment claim to succeed on"). The empirical data on this point is
somewhat mixed, however, and may depend on the sample of cases studied. For example,
in their analysis of a sample of over 1,000 employment discrimination cases filed between
the late 1980s and early 20009, Laura Beth Nielsen and various colleagues found that sex
discrimination cases are comparatively more likely to be dismissed at the pleading stage,
see BERREY ET AL., supra note 11, at 66-68, and to be lost on summary judgment, see Jill
D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination,Experience, and
Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 340-42 (2012). Relative comparisons
aside, however, both race and sex discrimination cases are overwhelmingly unsuccessful.
13.
See, e.g., LAURA BETH NIELSEN ET AL., CONTESTING WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION
IN COURT 21, 48 (2008), http:J/www.americanbarfoundation.orguploads/cms/document/nie
lsenabf_edLreportL_08_finaLpdf (httpsJ/permaocc/D3K-355C] (noting that in a randomly
selected sample of employment discrimination cases filed in seven federal judicial districts
between 1988 and 2003, eighty percent of race discrimination claims were brought by
African-American plaintiffs, and only eight percent by white plaintiffs); Parker, supra note
12, at 897-98, 906 (noting that in a national sample of Title VII disparate treatment cases
published in 2003, about sixty percent were brought by African-American plaintiffs, and
only ten percent by white plaintiffs).
14.
See Clermont & Schwab, supranote 7, at 113 (noting the possibility that "district
courts process employment discrimination cases with a neutral or even jaundiced eye
toward plaintiffs" and that "unconscious biases may be at work at the appellate level").
15.
According to at least one scholar, various other explanations that have been
proposed, including that there has been a change in societal biases from open prejudice to
the subtle and structural bias that makes discrimination harder to prove, that
comparatively many employment discrimination claims lack merit, and that the best cases
settle rather than being resolved in court, cannot fully explain the terrible record of success
of employment discrimination plaintiffs. See Eyer, supranote 10, at 1286-91.
16.
See infra Section I.B (discussing illustrative data and research studies in more
detail). Such continued discrimination also helps explain why the vast majority of
employment discrimination plaintiffs claiming race discrimination continue to be workers
of color, as noted above.
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VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the federal statute governing race
discrimination in employment, significantly contributes to this
lack of success by discrimination claimants. Scholars have
criticized the doctrine as a complicated "morass"'17 that is in
significant part the outcome of restrictive judicial interpretation
of broad statutory language (especially since the 1980s),
notwithstanding intermittent legislative intervention meant to
broaden workers' antidiscrimination protections.' 8 This restrictive
interpretation has created a doctrine that in many of its specifics,
including in the race discrimination context, discredits
discrimination claims of plaintiffs, who are predominantly
workers of color. 19
This is deeply troubling. After all, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly reminded us that one of the main goals of Title VII was
to create lasting improvements in the working conditions of racial
minorities, in particular black Americans, and to ensure equal
opportunities for minority workers to succeed in the workplace. 20
17.
See, e.g., Martin J. Katz, Unifying DisparateTreatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J.
643, 645 n.8 (2008) ("Courts and commentators have routinely referred to current disparate
treatment doctrine as a 'swamp,' a 'morass,' and a 'quagmire.' (citations omitted)). Other
scholars have, even more pessimistically, concluded that this area of the law is
fundamentally broken. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination
Law, 62 SMU L. REv. 81, 116 (2009) (arguing that employment discrimination law "is now

so bad that judges do not know how to analyze motions for summary judgment or properly
instruct juries").
18. In particular, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 not only expanded the remedies
available under Title VII to include damages but specifically responded to restrictive
decisions of the Supreme Court that had narrowed the reach of the statute. See Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, §§ 3, 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981) (noting one purpose of the legislation was "to respond to recent decisions of
the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes," which included
Title VII).
19. See generally, e.g., Katz, supra note 17, at 655-58; Corbett, supranote 17; Victor
D. Quintanilla & Cheryl R. Kaiser, The Same-Actor Inference of Nondiscrimination:Moral
Credentialingand the Psychologicaland Legal Licensing of Bias, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6,
39-40 (2016); Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment
Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 77 Mo. L. REV. 149 (2012); Natasha T.
Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 Mo.L. REV. 313 (2010); Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise
of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to "Wo Cause"
Employment, 81 TEx. L. REV. 1177 (2003); Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism
Defense and Affirmative Action.: A Critical Perspective on the Distinction Between
Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decision Making Under Title Vii, 39 AIZ. L. REV. 1003
(1997).

20. See, e.g., Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421, 448 (1986) ("[1]t was clear to Congress that '[t]he crux of the problem [was] to open
employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed
to them,'.., and it was to this problem that Title VIrs prohibition against racial
discrimination in employment was primarily addressed." (alterations in original) (quoting
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203 (1979))); Weber, 443 U.S. at 202
("Congress' primary concern in enacting the prohibition against racial discrimination in
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In interpreting and applying Title VII race discrimination law, the
federal judiciary (including the Supreme Court itself) has not
delivered on these goals for decades now. The first vignette above,
taken from a real case, is illustrative of the resulting "fool me once"
problem for racial minority plaintiffs: despite being the primary
intended beneficiaries of Title VII's prohibition of race
even when
discrimination, they have terrible chances of success
21
discrimination.
such
of
they have strong evidence
Given the crucial importance of employment to most people's
livelihoods, especially for racial minorities who already
disproportionately suffer from social and economic stratification,
it is important to uncover the reasons underlying this
longstanding disconnect between asserted statutory goals and
interpretive practice so that effective countermeasures can be
developed. Yet, comparatively few scholarly analyses, particularly
22
outside of the implicit bias literature, have tried to do so by
combining traditional doctrinal and theoretical23 analyses with
systematic empirical insights from social science.
The first major goal of this Article is to offer an analytical
framework that takes on this task in a novel way and explains the
federal judiciary's cramped interpretation of Title VII race
discrimination law based on conclusions from social psychology.
This framework combines findings from Social Dominance Theory
(SDT)-a social-psychological theory with a considerable footprint
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was with 'the plight of the Negro in our economy.'
(citation omitted)); cf. Regents of the Univ. of CaL v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 285 (1978) (noting
that in enacting Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the "problem confronting Congress
was discrimination against Negro citizens at the hands of recipients of federal moneys" and
that "the legislators were dealing with the real and pressing problem of how to guarantee
those citizens equal treatment").
In particular, the first vignette illustrates how existing doctrine credits as
21.
nondiscriminatory even highly suspicious (and perhaps factually inaccurate) justifications

for negative actions taken by employers against workers of color. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text. See also infra Sections I.A,III.B.2.
For two well-known examples of implicit bias literature that address employment
22.
discrimination law, see, for example, Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59

UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012), and Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories"A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 1161 (1995). Another example is Victor D. Quintanilla, Critical Race Empiricism:
A New Means to Measure Civil Procedure,3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 187 (2013), which mobilizes

implicit bias research related to the phenomenon of "aversive racism," as well as the concept
of "lay theories of racism," to analyze the effect of changes in pleading rules on employment
discrimination cases brought by minority plaintiffs.
See Eyer, supra note 10, at 1286, 1291 (noting that 'the overwhelming majority
23.
of scholarly attempts to posit a cause for the difficult odds that discrimination litigants face
are based on a loose, intuitive approach to understanding the phenomenon, with little or
no empirical foundation" and proposing an explanation grounded in psychological research
on attribution).
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in social science journals but that has yet to significantly enter
legal scholarship 24-with
insights from Critical Race Theory
(CRT) and conceptualizes the interpretation of race discrimination
law as a mechanism through which racial hierarchy is regulated
and, in the main, (re-)produced. SDT researchers have uncovered
robust evidence that basic human psychological preferences for
society to be organized as a group-based (including racial)
hierarchy can influence different groups of people to think and
behave in ways that help to create and maintain such hierarchy. 25
This Article argues that there are good empirical reasons to think
that federal judges as a group (with individual variation to be sure)
have comparatively strong such preferences, and that they will act
in accordance with those preferences when interpreting hierarchyrelevant laws such as Title VII's race discrimination provisions.
These preferences influence, among other things, people's baseline
assumptions and perceptions of the prevalence of discrimination
against different groups, their views on the desirability of
antidiscrimination intervention, as well as the ideologies people
use to explain the world around them. This Article analyzes Title
VII race discrimination doctrine with reference to these
psychological processes and shows how they explain the doctrine's
suspicion towards claims of discrimination by workers of color, its
many rules that discredit their allegations, and why it rejects the
vast majority of their claims as a result.2 6 Uncovering the
interpretation of employment discrimination law as a process at
least partially driven by the judiciary's preferences for group-

24.
For example, searches for the term "Social Dominance Theory" in the Law
Journal Library on HeinOnline and Westlaw's "Law Reviews and Journals" database
conducted on April 24, 2019, resulted in only fifty-nine and forty-seven hits respectively.
By contrast, similar searches for another concept from social psychology that has infiltrated
legal scholarship to a significant degree, "implicit bias," result in about 3,000 hits on each.
When Social Dominance Theory has been referred to in legal scholarship, this has often
been in the criminal law context. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Continually

Reminded of Their Inferior Position":Social Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, and
Race, 46 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 23, 92 (2014); Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What

Exposes African Americans to Police Violence, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 175-79
(2016). But see Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination:A Matter of PerspectiveRather Than

Intent, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 657, 673-76 (2003) (briefly summarizing certain tenets
of SDT in the employment discrimination context, but concluding that while SDT "offers
important insights into how we arrived where we are today, [it does so] without providing
much guidance into how we might obtain a greater understanding of the continued

pervasiveness of discrimination"); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, PreventingBalkanizationor
FacilitatingRacialDomination:A Critiqueof the New Equal Protection,22 VA. J. SOC. POLY
& L. 1, 40-42 (2015) (applying SDT in an analysis of constitutional equal protection
doctrine). This Article argues that this gap in the legal literature ought to be filled.

25.
26.

See infra Section ILA.
See infra Part I.
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based social hierarchy, in turn, has important implications for
potential reform, including illustrating the27 likely benefits of
increasing judicial diversity of various kinds.
The second major goal of this Article is to show that its
analytical framework not only helps us better understand the
ongoing judicial interpretation of employment discrimination law,
and
descriptions
popular
that
illustrates
also
but
conceptualizations of the overall logic of Title VII jurisprudence
are inaccurate and potentially unhelpful. Taking a hierarchycentered view of Title VII doctrine counsels against accepting what
seems to be a relatively broad consensus that (1) Title VII in
general, and its race discrimination provisions in particular, are
"symmetrical" (i.e., they protect all groups covered by the law in
the same general fashion 28); and (2) to the extent that the doctrine
is asymmetrical (i.e., provides certain protections to some but not
other groups), it is asymmetrical in favor of racial minorities
because it allows for affirmative action. 29 This Article argues that,
instead, Title VII race discrimination jurisprudence, its
affirmative action doctrine included, should be understood as
being fundamentally asymmetrical to the disadvantageof workers
of color while protecting the interests of white workers to a greater
extent.30
See infra Part IV.
27.
Two recent law review articles take specific interest in the notion of "symmetry"
28.
as an animating principle in employment discrimination law. See Naomi Schoenbaum, The
Case for Symmetry in AntidiscriminationLaw, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 69, 76 (stating that "the
term symmetrical... describe[s] an antidiscrimination law that does not limit the scope of
persons who are protected on the basis of a given trait, nor does it limit the direction of
discrimination prohibited"); Bradley A. Areheart, The Symmetry Principle,58 B.C. L. REV.
1085, 1088 (2017) (describing the "symmetry principle" as "mandat[ing] that once certain
attributes or characteristics are identified as worthy of antidiscrimination protection, all

groups within that universal ground must be protected"). Both list Title VII race
discrimination provisions as an example of a symmetrical law. See Schoenbaum, supra, at
79; Areheart, supra,at 1088-89. Both Schoenbaum and Areheart argue that, as a general
matter, symmetrical antidiscrimination laws are preferable to asymmetrical ones, though
Areheart concludes that for some protected characteristics, including race, asymmetry may
be justified in certain contexts. Areheart, supra, at 1133-36; Schoenbaum, supra,at 73-75.
See, e.g., Schoenbaum, supra note 28, at 131 (suggesting that affirmative action
29.
programs could be made symmetrical if they allowed privileged groups to take advantage
of them, implying that current approaches to affirmative action are asymmetrical in favor
of disadvantaged groups); Areheart, supra note 28, at 1126, 1135 (characterizing
affirmative action as a "limited departure" from the norm of symmetry, but ultimately
concluding that this departure is warranted); see also infra Section mH.B.3 (discussing the
attack on affirmative action as illegitimate "preferences" in favor of racial minorities in
greater detail).
30. My argument in this Article does not dispute the broad claim that under Title VII
both white workers and workers of color are included in the groups protected by the statute.
That much has been settled. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280
(1976). I contest the claim that, to the extent that Title VII features asymmetries, it favors
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This is because, consistent with what this Article's analytical
framework predicts, the federal judiciary has interpreted Title VII
in ways that make it comparatively easy to prevail for litigants
whose interest is to preserve existing racial hierarchy in the
workplace (most employers and white workers) and comparatively
difficult for litigants whose interest is to reduce existing hierarchy
(employers who pursue affirmative action and workers of color).
As a result, Title VII race discrimination law is neither always
hostile to plaintiffs nor always friendly to employers. Rather, it is
hostile to plaintiffs in "traditional" race discrimination cases 31 like
the first vignette above, which prototypically challenge racial
hierarchy because they are predominantly brought by workers of
color.3 2 By contrast, it provides greater comparative protection to

plaintiffs in affirmative action cases (prototypically white
workers) in which plaintiffs aim to prevent interference with
38
existing hierarchy, as shown in the second vignette above.
workers of color.
31.
As I explain more in Part I below, by "traditional" cases I mean cases in which
workers claim that an employer took an adverse action against them on the basis of their
race while the employer claims to have taken the action for nonracial reasons (i.e.,
independently of any affirmative action program). See infra Part I.
32.
See infra Section III.B.2.
33.
See infra Section III.B.3. In other words, my argument is more nuanced than
simply to say that employment discrimination law always favors white plaintiffs or that
federal judges are overtly biased against workers of color. The asymmetry in employment
discrimination law that I describe in this Article can be viewed instead as the outcome of
judging and interpreting over time in which some types of cases ("traditional" disparate
treatment claims) are associated with challenges to existing hierarchy because they are
most often brought by workers of color. As a result of the psychological processes that I
discuss in more detail below, the doctrine that develops to adjudicate such cases becomes
comparatively harsh to plaintiffs because the federal judiciary, on the whole, prefers to
maintain existing hierarchy. When white plaintiffs (though more infrequently) bring such
types of cases, they thus also face a hostile doctrine and may frequently lose as well. But
see infra Section If.B.1 (showing how even in "traditional" cases there are asymmetries
comparatively favoring the claims of white workers in some circuits). Based on existing
empirical data, for example, it is not clear that white employment discrimination plaintiffs
have significantly higher success rates than nonwhite plaintiffs in all instances. Compare
BERREY ET AL., supra note 11, at 70 (noting that white plaintiffs are more likely to avoid
dismissal of their pleadings than plaintiffs of color, but that thereafter, white plaintiffs and
plaintiffs of color fare similarly), and Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, The Realism of Race
in JudicialDecision Making: An Empirical Analysis of Plaintiffs'Race and Judges' Race,
28 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 91, 99, 100 tbl.1 (2012) (in sample of reported racial
harassment decisions, white plaintiffs were successful slightly more often than black
plaintiffs, but less often than Hispanic plaintiffs), with Parker, supranote 12, at 907 (noting
that in one sample of published race discrimination cases, whites had a lower success rate
as plaintiffs than workers of color). It is somewhat difficult to disentangle those numbers.
One could argue that, given the continued dominance of white workers in the economy
overall, see infra Section II.B., and comparatively low levels of self-reporting by white
workers that they are experiencing bias in the workplace, see BERREY ET AL., supra note 11,
at 47, white workers are much less likely to be discriminated against based on their race
(as opposed to other personal characteristics, for example); that the race discrimination
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Similarly,. employers are treated deferentially when defending
"traditional" cases, 34 but with greater hostility when defending
affirmative action programs. 35 One common source for all of these
asymmetries is a "baseline error"-an often unspoken assumption,
counter to the weight of the evidence but consistent with Social
Dominance Theory, that discrimination against workers of color is
not sufficiently frequent to warrant particular attention, and that
discrimination against white workers warrants just as much (if
not more) judicial concern. 36 In all cases, however, workers of color
receive the short end of the stick because the doctrine consistently
such
workers
their
interests.
Thus,
undervalues
disproportionately miss out on employment opportunities, and
racial hierarchy in the workplace persists.
Given the Supreme Court's repeated command that one of the
main purposes of Title VII is the elimination of racial hierarchy in
the workplace,3 7 and the fact that Title VII grew out of the Civil
Rights Movement's efforts to end the subordination of workers of
color, this is highly problematic. Research findings from SDT and
the framework proposed in this Article help us explain why we
should nevertheless not be surprised to see the existing doctrinal
landscape. They also help us better evaluate potential unintended
negative consequences of reform proposals that proceed from a
view of Title VII doctrine as symmetrical or, if anything,
asymmetrical in favor of workers of color. 38
claims that white plaintiffs bring thus may well include a greater proportion of weak claims;

and that, as a result, white plaintiffs should be comparatively less successful over the run
of cases. Therefore, the fact that they appear to do similarly as well as minority plaintiffs
may itself suggest that federal judges apply employment discrimination law comparatively

more favorably to white plaintiffs. It is also possible that affirmative action cases, in which
the doctrine is friendlier to (white) plaintiffs, see infra Section Im.B.3, play at least some

role in raising white plaintiffs' win rates to comparable levels with minority plaintiffs.
Unfortunately, existing empirical studies do not distinguish between "traditional" and
affirmative action cases or give an indication of how many affirmative action cases are being

brought. Additionally, it is difficult, if not impossible, to know how many affirmative action
programs are not adopted because employers are wary of testing a more hostile doctrine.
34.
See infra Section I.B.2.
35.
See infra Section MI.B.3.
36.
See infra Section H.B.
37. In the Courts most well-known disparate treatment case, McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973), the Court described this purpose as being "to

assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory
practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the
disadvantage of minority citizens." In the Court's most well-known disparate impact case,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971), the Supreme Court declared that
Congress' objective in enacting Title VII was "to achieve equality of employment

opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of white employees over other employees."
38.

See infra Part IV.
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Overall, then, there are several gaps between Supreme Court
rhetoric about what Title VII is meant to achieve and the actual
interpretive practice of both the Supreme Court itself and the
lower courts. These gaps manifest themselves in doctrinal
asymmetries that consistently under-protect the employment
opportunities of workers of color and can be uncovered by a close
interrogation of doctrinal rules that apply to different types of
cases.3 9 It is important to uncover these asymmetries and their
social psychological origins so that we can begin to develop
countermeasures that help us move closer to the stated goals of
federal employment race discrimination law. 40 This Article speaks
to all of these steps.
Part H provides an overview of this Article's main analytical
framework. It begins in Section IIA with an overview of Social
Dominance Theory and lays out SDT's claim that human societies
develop as, and predictably remain, group-based social
hierarchies. These hierarchies are aided in their stability by a
complex interplay between individual psychology, individual and
institutional behavior, and social and cultural ideologies. The law
can be understood to play a critical role in this process. I propose
two analytical heuristics that place the interpretation of
antidiscrimination law by the courts into the SDT framework. I
call these heuristics asymmetrical narrowing and proof
asymmetry. I also discuss important contributions that SDT can
make to a more comprehensive understanding of employment
discrimination law. Section II.B gives a brief overview of the
concepts of "framework critique" and "baseline error" that scholars
in Critical Race Theory have developed, and which integrate
productively with SDT.
39.
Cheryl Harris has recently made a simila point, that doctrinal asymmetries that
disfavor workers of color can be uncovered through a comparison of Title VII doctrine and
constitutional equal protection analysis. Cheryl I. Harris, Limiting Equality: The
Divergence and Convergence of Title VII and Equal Protection, 2014 U. CHm. LEGAL F. 95,

98 (2014) ("[C]ompeting views have come to cohere in endorsing interpretations that have
weakened antidiscrimination protection for non-whites, while enabling whites' challenges
to those same remedial measures. The Court's comparative reasoning often is not racially
neutral: The interplay between Title VII and equal protection has functioned
asymmetrically to (re)produce an unequal doctrinal terrain."). This Article undertakes a
similar project, though with a different target and conceptual framework.

40. See Erik J. Girvan, On Using the PsychologicalScience ofImplicit Bias to Advance
Anti-Discrimination Law, 26 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 75-76 (2015) (noting that
psychologists have "found strong evidence of personality traits that relate to people's
political ideology and whether they support policies that implicate equality" including
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), an aspect of SDT further discussed below, and that
"[p]roposals for and arguments supporting expanded anti-discrimination rights and duties
that fail to take these fundamental differences of values and worldview into account are far
less likely to be accepted").
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Part III applies the framework of Part II in analyzing Title
VII doctrine and uncovering its racial asymmetries. In particular,
I focus on disparate treatment 4' doctrine regulating race
discrimination claims. 42 I first analyze the doctrine that applies to
the claims prototypically brought by racial minorities as plaintiffs,
i.e., cases like the first vignette above. In particular, I focus on the
burden-shifting regime established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green43 and, using the framework from Part II, show how its
current doctrinal logic is fundamentally asymmetrical to the
detriment of workers of color. I then compare such "traditional"
disparate treatment cases to Title VII affirmative action doctrine,
i.e., the doctrine that applies to cases like the second vignette
above. This doctrine is based on a modification of the McDonnell
Douglas scheme, but an analysis of its rules shows how Title VII
operates much more favorably to plaintiffs when they are
prototypically white claimants challenging interference with

41. There are two broad types of employment discrimination claims under Title VII:
disparate treatment claims and disparate impact claims. Disparate treatment claims
involve cases in which an employer is alleged to have intentionally discriminated against a
worker based on a legally protected characteristic, such as race, sex, age, etc. See infra
Section II.A. Disparate impact claims involve cases in which an employer's business
practice, which was not used or adopted to intentionally discriminate based on a protected
characteristic, nevertheless has a disproportionate negative impact on a protected group
(for example, an employment test that screens out disproportionately more women than
men). I focus on disparate treatment cases because this theory of discrimination is by far
the most frequently asserted. See, e.g., NIELSEN ET AL., supra note 13, at 11, 48 (noting that
in a randomly selected sample of 1,779 employment discrimination cases filed in seven
federal judicial districts between 1987 and 2003, ninety-eight percent of cases involved
disparate treatment claims and only four percent involved disparate impact claims).
Disparate impact law also raises a number of distinct analytical questions, and thus
requires separate analysis.
42. I focus on race discrimination because, as much research shows, "for most of U.S.
history, race.., has been and remains the primary basis of social stratification." SIDANIUS
& PRATTO, supranote 1, at 61. Thus, when it comes to issues of social power and hierarchy
in the United States, and the law's involvement in both, it is critical to understand the
dynamics of race and racial ideology. Indeed, the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Title VII
emerged out of one of the most contentious periods of race relations in the United States.
See generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker:
The Events Leading to the Introductionof the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645
(1995); CLAY RISEN, THE BILL OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS

ACT (2014). As noted above, race discrimination cases are also one of the-if not the-most
frequently litigated type of employment discrimination case. See supra note 11. Increasing
our understanding of the dynamics driving race discrimination cases should improve our
understanding of employment discrimination law generally. The limitation to race and
racial discrimination is also necessary to keep the scope of an already complex argument
manageable and accessible. Analyzing other axes of power and hierarchy also covered by
antidiscrimination law, particularly sex and gender, and the intersections between them,
are also crucially important, though sufficiently complex to require separate focused
analysis.
43. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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existing hierarchy. Both areas combine to preserve existing racial
hierarchy in the American workplace. The framework developed
in Part 1H provides a powerful aid in explaining why this is so.
Finally, Part IV begins a conversation about the implications
of my analysis for potential solutions to the problematic state of
employment discrimination law. I discuss some of the proposals
for doctrinal reform that scholars have already offered and argue
that they risk unintended consequences that may further solidify
aspects of existing racial hierarchy. Their implementation could
also undermine support, and a coherent ideological basis, for more
effective remedies--most prominently broader affirmative action
programs. Accordingly, Part IV takes a first cut at offering some
alternative suggestions for reform. Some could be implemented
more short term, such as modifying previous doctrinal choices.
Others recognize that any lasting progress towards reducing the
negative effects of racial hierarchy, and the law's complicity in it,
will have to include more structural changes. Such changes could
include, most prominently, broadening the pipeline into the
federal judiciary in a hierarchy-conscious manner.
II. A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A. An Overview of Social Dominance Theory"
1.
Basic Conceptual Structure. Social Dominance Theory
starts from the observation that, historically, all human societies
producing economic surplus have organized as systems of groupbased hierarchy. 45 While the specific form and ideological
foundation may differ between societies and over time, the fact
that human societies are structured as group-based hierarchies in
which one or more social groups are dominant, and one or more
social groups are subordinated, is a general feature of societies
throughout history. 46
According to SDT, this group-based hierarchical structure is
based on three different stratification systems: (a) an age system
in which adults have disproportionate social power over children;
(b) a gender system in which men have disproportionate social

44. Because Social Dominance Theory has not been used much in the legal literature
to date, this Section provides a more detailed overview of the theory.
45.
See, eg., SIDANIUs & PRATrO, supra note 1, at 31-32. "Group-based hierarchy
broadly means that in such a society, "one's social status, influence, and power are also a
function of one's group membership and not simply of one's individual abilities or
characteristics." Id at 32.
46. Id..

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

1048

66:5

power over women; and (c) an "arbitrary-set" system which
implements social hierarchy along any number of socially
constructed group categories that may be salient in a given
society's context, such as social class, caste, race, and others. 47 In
the United States, "for most of U.S. history, race ... has been and
remains the primary basis of social stratification," 48 and is also the
primary focus of this Article. Arbitrary sets are typically
associated with the most extreme forms of violence against
subordinated groups and are more flexible in how they manifest
49
themselves and change over time.
SDT sees societies as dynamic systems in which group-based
hierarchy is the net effect of behavior and decision-making at
various societal levels, including aggregated individual
discrimination, aggregated institutional discrimination, and
behavioral asymmetry among groups at different levels of the
hierarchy. 50 Behavioral asymmetry refers to group differences in
behavior between dominant and subordinated groups as a result
of their fundamentally different social circumstances, such that
dominant groups "behave in ways that are more beneficial to
themselves" compared to subordinate groups. 5 ' These processes
are mediated by legitimizing ideologies or "myths," i.e., "attitudes,
values, beliefs, stereotypes, and ideologies that provide moral and
intellectual justification for the social practices that distribute
'52
social value within the social system.
People's behavior within any given society is partially driven
by individual differences in people's support and preference for
group inequality and for social systems to be structured as groupbased hierarchies. This individual difference is captured by a
construct called Social Dominance Orientation (SDO).5 Although
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 33.
Id. at 61.
See, e.g., Felicia Pratto et al., Social Dominance Theory and the Dynamics of

IntergroupRelations: Taking Stock and Looking Forward,17 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 271,
273-74 (2006).

50.
See, e.g., Jim Sidanius et al., Social Dominance Theory: Its Agenda and Method,
25 POL. PSYCHOL. 845, 847-48 (2004).
51.
SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 1, at 227.
52. Id. at 45-46.
SDO is a survey-based measure in which people indicate their agreement with
53.
various statements such as: '[s]ome groups of people are simply inferior to other groups."
Id. at 67. Researchers have attempted to improve and fine-tune this measure over time. See
generally id. at 61-102. Recent research has shown that SDO has two subdimensions, a
Dominance dimension (SDO-D) reflecting a person's support for active suppression,
domination, and aggression towards subordinates; and an Anti-Egalitarianism dimension
(SDO-E) reflecting a person's support for more subtle means of creating and sustaining
hierarchy, such as cultural ideologies. See, e.g., Arnold K. Ho et al., The Nature of Social
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SDO is an important analytical concept within the theory, SDT
does not explain societal inequality only based on individual
differences5 4 or considers SDO as a "pathological" condition that
permanently divides "good" from "bad" people.5 5 Rather, SDO is
seen as an attribute "thought to reflect normal human variation
and to be influenced by a combination of socialization experiences,
contextually sensitive material and symbolic interests (e.g., high
social status), and dispositional differences in factors such as
aggression and lack of empathy."5 In other words, SDO is a
complex and interactive variable that is sensitive to context and
acts as "both an effect and a cause of intergroup attitudes and
behaviors." 57 Still, SDO has been found to be a "relatively stable
cause of prejudice against outgroups and legitimizing ideologies
helping to justify opposition to social policies beneficial to
subordinate groups.15 8 Moreover, SDT has made a number of
robust findings regarding the general distribution of SDO among
different groups in society. Relevant to this Article, SDT has
consistently found that members of dominant social groups,
particularly dominant racial groups (whites in the United States)
and men, on average have significantly higher levels of SDO than
subordinate racial groups and women. 59 Thus, on the whole,
Dominance Orientation:Theorizing and Measuring Preferences for Intergroup Inequality
Using the New SD0 7 Scale, 109 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1003, 1004-05 (2015).
SDO-D and SDO-E are highly correlated with each other.
54. See Sidanius et al., supra note 50, at 849 ("Whereas SDO is an important
component of the broader model, social dominance theory is neither primarily nor
exclusively concerned with this individual-difference construct."); see also Jim Sidanius et
al., Social Dominance Theory: Explorations in the Psychology of Oppression, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 152 (Chris G. Sibley & Fiona

Kate Barlow eds., 2017).
55. See Sidanius et al, supra note 50, at 858; Felicia Pratto, The Puzzle of Continuing
Group Inequality: Piecing Together Psychological, Social, and Cultural Forces in Social
Dominance Theory, in 31 ADVANCES INEXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 191, 252 (Mark
P. Zanna ed., 1999) (explaining that "we have not theorized that people high on SDO are
abnormal and fundamentally different").
56. Sidanius et al., supra note 50, at 858.
57. Nour S. Kteily et al., Social Dominance Orientation: Cause or 'Mere Effect?:
Evidence for SDO as a Causal Predictorof Prejudice and DiscriminationAgainst Ethnic
and Racial Outgroups, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 208, 209 (2011).
58. Id. at 213 (citations omitted).
59. This finding is most comprehensively addressed in the 2011 meta-analysis of IChing Lee and colleagues, which reviewed data from 206 samples in 118 independent
studies. I-Ching Lee et al., Intergroup Consensus/Disagreementin Support of Group-Based
Hierarchy:An ExaminationofSocio-StructuralandPsycho-CulturalFactors,137 PSYCHOL
BULL. 1029, 1036 (describing studies reviewed and findings). The authors found that
average SDO levels of whites and males were consistently and significantly higher than
those of women and of nonwhite racial groups in the United States (though perhaps with
the exception of Asian American groups). See id. at 1038 tbl.3 (men versus women), 1043
tbL5 (whites vs. nonwhites), 1057-64 (listing all studies and effect sizes). See also Ho et al.,
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members of such dominant groups will be more supportive of
group-based hierarchy than women and racial minorities. As
discussed below, this has significant implications in analyzing the
federal judiciary and its decision-making in hierarchy-relevant
contexts such as employment discrimination.
SDT is fundamentally concerned with the dynamic
interaction between individual differences, social ideologies,
discrimination at the individual and institutional level, and
behavioral asymmetries between dominant and subordinate
groups, and how the interaction of these factors creates,
influences, and stabilizes group-based hierarchy.6° In this dynamic
model, the development and maintenance of group-based
hierarchy are not seen as stemming from a single root cause, but
rather as the result of a system in which individual parts are both
a cause and effect of other parts, mutually influencing and
61
reinforcing one another.
Finally, in the SDT framework people's behavior, societal
roles, legitimizing myths, and social policies can take on two forms,
depending on whether they manifest support for the maintenance
or enhancement of group-based hierarchy ("hierarchy-enhancing"
or "HE") or whether they manifest support for the reduction or
elimination of this hierarchy ("hierarchy-attenuating" or '"A").
The level of hierarchy in a society depends on the net balance of
hierarchy-enhancing and hierarchy-attenuating forces (see

Figure

1).62

supranote 53, at 1020-21, 1020 tbl.10, 1021 tbl.11; Pratto, supra note 55, at 230, 231 tbLVI.
60.
See, e.g., Pratto et al, supra note 49, at 275-81; infra Figure 1.
See Pratto, supra note 55, at 248. As a result, "there is some redundancy in the
61.
system" making it "unlikely that interrupting one process will break the whole system,
adding to the system's resiliency." Id.
62.
Taken from SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 1, at 40.
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Figure 1. General Overview of Social Dominance Theory

Within this general conceptual structure, SDT has developed
more specific claims which are relevant to the arguments in this
Article.
2.
A Closer Look at Legitimizing Ideologies. Legitimizing
ideologies or "myths" play an important role in SDT because they
operationalize the idea that power and hierarchy are more
effectively maintained (especiafly over the long-run) not with
brute force, but through consensual ideology. 6 s Legitimizing myths
"consist of attitudes, values, beliefs, stereotypes, and ideologies
that provide moral and intellectual justification for the social
practices that distribute social value within the social system." 6 4A
legitimizing myth can be hierarchy-enhancing when it "enhance[s]
social hierarchy by justifying it or the practices that sustain it," or
hierarchy-attenuating, when it "reduce[s] social hierarchy by
delegitimizing inequality or the practices that sustain it, or by
suggesting values that contradict hierarchy (e.g., inclusiveness). 6 '5
Legitimizing myths "mediate the relationship" between
people's individual preference for group-based hierarchy (i.e., SDO
levels) and support for social policies. That is, the higher a person's
SDO level, the more likely that person is to Support a HE social
policy, and this relationship is explained by the person's support

63.

64.
65.

See, e.g., SWDAMUS & PRATTO, supra note 1, at 103.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 104.
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for the HE legitimizing myth(s) that is mobilized to justify this

policy. Similarly, the lower a person's SDO level, the more likely
that person is to support a HA social policy, and this relationship
is explained by the person's support for HA legitimizing myth(s)
66
that justify the policy (see Figure 2).67
Figure 2. Relationships between SDO, Legitimizing Myths, and

Social Policy

Further, given that the content of ideologies is often
indeterminate to some extent, the type of rationale underlying a
particular ideology could be either hierarchy-enhancing or
hierarchy-attenuating. SDO levels should correlate positively with
HE rationales and negatively with
rationales ostensibly describing the
important about legitimizing myths is
but rather the "degree to which people

HA rationales--even for
same ideology.6 6 What is
not their "objective" truth,
believe the statement to be

66. See, e.g., Pratto et al., supra note 49, at 287-88; SIDAN1US & PRATT'O, spra note
1, at 104-05, 118--23. By extension, as illustrated by minus signs for the diagonals in Figure
2, higher levels of SDO and resulting support for HE legitimizing myths also lead to
comparatively lower support for HA social policies. Similarly, lower levels of SDO and
greater support for HA legitimizing myths lead to lower support for HE social policies.
67. Taken from Pratto et al., supra note 49, at 282 (citing SIDANJIUS & PRATTO, supra
note 1, at 105).
68.
See, e.g., SIDANIUS & PRATTO, Supra note 1, at 89; see als Eric D. Knowles et al.,
On the Malleability of Ideology: Motivated Construals of Color Blindness, 96 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857, 858 (2009). For example, as discussed further below,
the ideology of "colorblindness" could be interpreted as a distributive justice commitment
to equal (i.e., colorblind) societal outcomes, in which case it would function as a HA ideology;
or it could be interpreted as a procedural justice commitment to formally equal treatment,
irrespective of outcomes, in which case it has the tendency to perpetuate existing
hierarchical distributions of social resources and would function as a HE ideology. See infra
notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
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true, and the role that this belief plays in providing moral and
intellectual support for [group, e.g.] racial domination."69 SDT
argues that the relationship between SDO and legitimizing myths
differs between social groups and that "the social attitudes and
policy preferences of dominants are more strongly motivated by
the desire to establish and maintain social hierarchy than those of
subordinates are."70 In other words, on the whole, members of
dominant groups, such as whites and men in the United States,
are more likely to subscribe to ideologies that provide support for
social practices that help perpetuate their social dominance, and
to do so more strongly.
3.
Sorting People into the Hierarchy.The dynamic processes
that lead to systems of group-based hierarchy also include the
sorting of different types of people into different social roles. 71 For
example, through a process of self-selection, hierarchy-enhancing
roles or roles in HE institutions-which include profit-maximizing
institutions and corporations 72 and the police 73 -are more likely to
be filled by people expressing greater support for group-based
hierarchy (i.e., those high in SDO). The opposite is true for HA
roles and institutions 74-which include civil rights groups, welfare
organizations, or public defender's offices. 75 SDT also argues that
social institutions will in general be organized such that power and
authority will disproportionately be wielded by dominant group
members. That is, according to the so-called increasing
disproportionality hypothesis, "the more political authority [is]
exercised by a given political position, the greater the probability
that this position will be occupied by a member of the dominant
group."

76

Importantly for purposes of this Article, SDT researchers
69. See Jim Sidanius et al., Legitimizing Ideologies: The Social Dominance Approach,
in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGTIMACY 310-11 (John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001).
70. Id. at 319. For example, in one random sample of Los Angeles County residents,
researchers found that the relationship between SDO and support for the death penalty (a
HE social policy) was much higher for white Americans than it was for African-Americans.
Id. at 321-22.
71. See, e.g., Sidanius et al.,
supra note 50, at 851-52.
72. See Pratto et al, supra note 49, at 276.
73. See, e.g., Sidanius et al.,
supra note 50, at 852.
74. See, e.g., id.; Hillary Haley & Jim Sidanius, Person-OrganizationCongruence and
the Maintenance of Group-Based Social Hierarchy: A Social Dominance Perspective, 8
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 187, 189-90 (2005).

75.
See, e.g., Pratto et al., supranote 49, at 277; Sidanius et al.,
supranote 50, at 852.
76. SIDANIUS & PRArrO, supra note 1, at 52. This "law of increasing disproportion
operates within all three forms of group-based stratification (ie., age system, gender
system, and arbitrary-set system)." Id.
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have uncovered evidence that processes of institutional
socialization can affect people's views regarding social dominance
and hierarchy. 77 There is even some evidence (though not from the
United States) that relates such processes to lawyers and the
study of law. In particular, Guimond and colleagues found that (1)
law students in France had significantly higher levels of SDO than
psychology students in general; and (2) there was evidence of a
socialization process resulting in upper-level (third or fourth year)
law students to have higher SDO levels than first-year law
students, while upper-level psychology students had lower SDO
levels than first-year psychology students. 78 In other words, there
was evidence for both self-selection and institutional socialization,
so that exposure to a HE environment in law school increased law
students' preferences for group-based hierarchy, which were
comparatively high to begin with. 79 Further, the authors found
experimental evidence suggesting that being assigned or found
qualified for a position of authority and high status might itself
increase SDO, which in turn is related to higher prejudice towards
outgroups. For example, in one of Guimond's experiments, study
participants, assigned at random to receive feedback that they
"have the profile of a person who is able to lead and to hold position
of high responsibility," showed significantly higher levels of SDO
than participants told that they had average such ability, as well
as significantly higher antiblack prejudice.8° In another
experiment, people, assigned at random (and told that they had
been assigned at random) to a position of director in a company,
showed higher levels of SDO than those assigned at random to a
position of secretary, as well as higher bias against North

77.
See Haley & Sidanius, supranote 74, at 195.
Serge Guimond et al., Does Social Dominance Generate Prejudice? Integrating
78.
Individual and Contextual Determinants of Intergroup Cognitions, 84 J. PERSONAITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 697, 701-06 (2003).
79.
See id. at 705-06. Follow-up research (unfortunately not involving lawyers)
confirmed this socialization effect in psychology and suggests that part of this effect may
be related to the fact that exposure to a HA environment reduces beliefs in "genetic
determinism," or the belief that genetics (rather than environmental forces) are the main
driver of human behavior and personality. See Michael Dambrun et al., Why Does Social

Dominance Orientation Decrease with University Exposure to the Social Sciences? The
Impact of InstitutionalSocialization and the Mediating Role of "Geneticism," 39 EuR. J.
SOC. PSYCHOL. 88, 97 (2009).

80.

Guimond et al., supranote 78, at 707-09. The authors suggested that these effects

may have been the "result of [participants] learning that they have what it takes to occupy
a dominant social position. Seeing themselves at the top leads them to perceive inequality

in a different manner. They are now ready to accept that certain groups should be at the
top and others at the bottom." Id. at 712.
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Africans. 81 Thus, the authors found the evidence "consistent with
the hypothesis that being promoted to a dominant social position
has a definite impact on SDO."82 Still, the authors also noted that
"this is not to suggest that leadership as such, or any position of
power in itself will produce an increase in prejudice," but, rather,
that 'it is only socialization in a position in an [HE] environment
that is expected to increase [HE] legitimizing myths (e.g., racism,
sexism, conservatism)."83
4. SDT, the Law, and Judicial Interpretation. While the
law's general position within the SDT framework has not been
theorized extensively by social psychologists, the interpretation
and application of the law can be understood as a critical
component that contributes to the existence and stability of
systems of group-based hierarchy.8 4 As SDT scholars have noted,
in societies that have "democratic and egalitarian pretensions,"
but, nevertheless, are characterized by clear group-based
hierarchy, such as the United States, the law will be one of the
major mechanisms that gives this hierarchy "plausibledeniability,
or the ability to practice discrimination, while at the same time
denying that any discrimination is actually taking place."8 5 I argue
that within the SDT framework, laws and legal doctrines occupy a
similar position to that of "social policy" in Figure 2, since they also
implement rules regarding the distribution of resources and
boundaries of appropriate behavior based on ideological
justifications. In other words, taking Figures 1 and 2 together, I
argue that the law mediates the relationship between personality
and ideology on the one hand, and individual and institutional
behavior, which in turn structures societal outcomes, on the other.
Thus, given the historical stability of group-based
hierarchies, 86 on balance and over time the law should function to
preserve group-based hierarchy. This is not to say that the law
will, without fail and in all cases, be structured in a way that
supports group-based hierarchy. As with other factors in the SDT
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 712-13, 713 fig.5.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 716.
See, e.g., James Sidanius, The Psychology of Group Conflict and the Dynamics of
Oppression:A Social Dominance Perspective, in EXPLORATIONS IN POLIrICAL PSYCHOLOGY

183, 201 (Shanto Iyengar & William J. McGuire eds., 1993) ("IT]he legal and criminal
justice system will be one of the major instruments used in establishing and maintaining
the hierarchical caste system.").
85.
See SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 1, at 42-43. I call this idea the "plausible
deniability expectation."
86. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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framework, the law can also be either hierarchy-enhancing or
hierarchy-attenuating. 87 In circumstances in which those with
lower SDO can mobilize HA forces to a greater degree than
countervailing HE forces, for example, legal regimes may emerge
that partially reduce group-based hierarchy.88 However, on
balance, HE legal regimes should predominate. With respect to
race in the United States, as many CRT scholars have argued, the
law (including employment discrimination law) has been a
has been
primary site in which racial inequality and hierarchy
89
legitimated.
main,
the
in
also,
but
both contested
I argue that the conceptual framework of SDT and its
empirical findings can, and should, be applied to inform our
9
analysis of judges' ongoing interpretation of the law. 0 Specifically,
I argue that a synthesis of the above findings suggests that the
interpretation of the law by judges, particularly when it involves
In the context of race, one particularly clear example of the law playing a
87.
hierarchy-enhancing role in service of protecting a racial hierarchy grounded in white
supremacy is the Naturalization Act of 1790, which restricted naturalization, and thus the
rights attaching to citizenship, to "free white person[s]." ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103. While this
statute was amended during the Reconstruction era to also allow naturalization by "aliens
of African nativity and... persons of African descent," Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16
Stat. 254, 256, outside of these categories immigrants generally had to continue to claim
whiteness to be able to naturalize deep into the 20th century. The U.S. Supreme Court
interpreted whiteness very restrictively in this context-for example, rejecting claims to
whiteness by immigrants from India and Japan. See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204
(1923); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, of which Title VII is a part, is an example. Civil
88.
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. It arose out of a period of mass struggle by
members of oppressed groups who, along with various allies, were able to build up enough
pressure to get Congress to outlaw an existing caste system of racial segregation and
explicit race-based discrimination in areas ranging from public accommodations to public
facilities and private employment. See generally, e.g., RISEN, supra note 42; Oppenheimer,
supra note 42. While there are disputes about how much interference with existing
hierarchy lawmakers really intended to allow, see infra note 230; and while this Article
shows how some of the Act's employment provisions have come to be interpreted in a
hierarchy-enhancing fashion; it is clear that, upon its passage, the Act represented a step
towards hierarchy attenuation. For an argument that the law is likely to operate in ways
beneficial to minorities only when this also serves the interests of whites, see Derrick A.
Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 518, 523 (1980) (proposing that important race cases have arguably been guided by a
principle of "interest convergence? by which the "interest of blacks in achieving racial
equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites" and
"the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, standing alone, will not authorize a judicial remedy
providing effective racial equality for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the
superior societal status of middle and upper class whites").
See, e.g., Harris, supra note 39, at 143-44 ("The point is not simply that the
89.
divisions among the justices mirror the political divisions within the country regarding
racial reform; rather, it is that the law also is a site where racial ideology is constituted,
divisions are constructed, and claims are legitimated.").
In Parts I and IV, I show how doing so helps explain why employment race
90.
discrimination doctrine looks the way it does today-and how it can be reformed.
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hierarchy-relevant issues such as employment discrimination
disputes involving claims of race discrimination, will be guided by
the process of asymmetrical narrowing, and the complementary
sub-process of proof asymmetry.9 1
Asymmetrical narrowing means that judges should, all else
being equal, interpret legal provisions in a way that takes a
narrow view of substantive rights likely to be claimed by members
of subordinate groups, and a comparatively broad view of rights
likely to be claimed by dominant groups. This could take the form,
for example, of developing a relatively "defendant-friendly"
doctrine in types of cases that are most often brought by members
of subordinate groups, but a relatively "plaintiff-friendly" doctrine
in cases most often brought by dominants. Alternatively, this could
take the form of favoring the interests of dominant groups when
substantive law requires a balancing of interests between
dominant and subordinate groups. Proof asymmetry is one of the
primary ways in which asymmetrical narrowingwill be achieved.
It refers to the idea that judges will develop legal tests and regimes
that make it comparatively easy for hierarchy-enhancing litigants
to prove or defend their case, particularly when it supports a HE
outcome, and comparatively difficult for hierarchy-attenuating
litigants to prove or defend their case, particularly when they are
seeking a HA outcome. Importantly, this means that the relative
treatment of one and the same litigant, such as a corporate
employer, should depend to a significant extent on the relationship
between the employer's litigation position and the maintenance of
racial hierarchy-i.e., whether the litigation position is HE or HA_
Expectations that judges should engage in asymmetrical
narrowingand proofasymmetry in hierarchy-relevant areas, such
as the interpretation of race discrimination law, can be derived
from various aspects of SDT's framework.
For example, per the increasing disproportionality
hypothesis, the judiciary should be composed mainly of members
of dominant groups, for whom the re-creation of group hierarchy
is most in their self-interest 2 A federal judgeship is a powerful
and prestigious position, and thus can be expected to be occupied
mainly by members of dominant groups-particularly white
91.

Both asymmetrical narrowingand proof asymmetry are terms that I have coined

for purposes of this Article and derived from my own review of SDT literature They do not
represent principles developed by SDT scholars in social psychology but represent my
application of relevant concepts to the analysis of race discrimination law.
92. See, e.g., Pratto, supra note 55, at 232 (noting that various studies "suggest that
people in dominant groups will discriminate to their own group's advantage more than
people in subordinate groups").
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males. This is, and always has been, the Case in the federal
judiciary. 93 While undoubtedly there are dominant group members
that are opposed to group-based social hierarchy, and some will be
part of the judiciary, SDT research suggests that, on the whole,
their "social attitudes and policy preferences... are more strongly
motivated by the desire to establish and maintain social
hierarchy."9 This suggests that, as a group, federal judges will
have more of an interest to preserve hierarchy than to subvert it.
More specifically, as most judges are from dominant groups,9 5
have been assigned to a significant position of leadership, and,
through the appointment process, have been given feedback that
they are, in fact, highly qualified for it96 they can also be expected
to have-on the whole, and with individual variation to be surecomparatively high levels of SDO.97 As discussed above, this
93. While Obama administration appointments created a significantly more diverse
judiciary, see Josh Katz, OlderJudges and Vacant Seats Give Trump Huge Power to Shape
American Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactivel2017/02
/14/upshot/trump-poised-to-transform-american-courts.html?_r-0 [https://perma.cc/PKJ5Y492], the federal judiciary as a whole is still filled mostly with dominant group members.
As of 2017, 75% of active circuit judges were white (45.6% white males) and slightly less
than 75% of active district court judges were white (49.3% white males). See BARRY J.
McMILLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43426, U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGES:
PROFILE OF SELECT CHARACTERISTICS 8 fig.4, 20 fig. 12 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/cra/misc/R
43426.pdf [https://perma.ccfMDD4-T842]. While these numbers reflect a much more diverse
current federal judiciary (overwhelmingly due to President Obama's nominations) than has
historically been the case, see Jonathan K. Stubbs, A Demographic History of Federal
JudicialAppointments by Sex and Race: 1789-2016, 26 LA RAZA L.J. 92, 99-112 (2016), the
Trump administration has moved decisively to reverse this trend and has almost
exclusively nominated white males for federal judgeships. See, e.g., Catherine Lucey &
Meghan Hoyer, Trump Choosing White Men as Judges, Highest Rate in Decades, CHI.TRIB.
(Nov. 13,2017), http-l/www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-trump-blacks(noting that
judges-20171113-story.html [https://perma.cc/6G59,JVDTtype--image]
ninety-one percent of Trump administration's nominees were white and eighty-one percent
male).
94. Sidanius, supra note 69, at 319.
95. For the relationship between dominant group status and SDO, see supranote 59
and accompanying text.
96. See supranotes 80-82 and accompanying text.
97. While I am not aware of research directly measuring the SDO levels of American
judges, SDT researchers have suggested that judges should have comparatively higher SDO
levels. See Jim Sidanius et al., ConsensualRacism and CareerTrack: Some Implicationsof
Social Dominance Theory, 12 POL. PSYCHOL. 691, 713 (1991) (suggesting-though study
dataset did not allow a direct conclusion in this regard-that "there should be power
differences for different institutions even within the general fields of law and business, and
we would expect that consensual racism, social dominance orientation, political ideology,
and the like should differ with those as well" so that "students preparing for careers as
criminal prosecutors, corporate lawyers, politicians, and judges should be more
discrimination-prone than students preparing for careers in civil rights or labor law or as
public defenders"). While this Article discusses much research showing how people with
comparatively high levels of SDO are more likely to behave in hierarchy-enhancing ways,
arguments in this regard are not dependent on some absolute measure of SDO or branding
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should be particularly true for white male judges. These higher
SDO levels should lead judges to interpret race discrimination law
in hierarchy-enhancing ways. This is because higher levels of SDO
are not only associated with greater general support for groupbased hierarchy,9 8 but researchers have also found a strong direct
relationship between SDO and opposition to antidiscrimination
policies,9 9 including in the employment context. For example,
researchers have found that people with higher SDO levels are
more likely to disagree with statements like "Society should make
sure that minorities get fair treatment in jobs" and "We need to
take more action to help stamp out the subtle discrimination that
members of certain social groups still face." 100
As discussed in more detail below, this relationship between
SDO and opposition to antidiscrimination policy is influenced by
the fact that people higher in SDO perceive less inequality to exist
such people as fundamentally "different." SDO is one aspect of life in group-based social
hierarchies. While SDO provides important explanatory value in contexts such as the topic
discussed in this Article, it acts in concert with other causes of inequality, such as more
structural forces of institutional discrimination. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying
text. Still, because social psychology research often focuses on individual psychological
differences, SDO has been the SDT concept most-often used in empirical research, and this
research has focused on how people that are comparatively high versus low on SDO behave
differently from each other. Thus, this Article relies on much of this research. This should
be seen not as a claim that there are "good" and "bad" people that drive social outcomes
solely as a function of their SDO levels. Rather, it reflects the fact that in complex systems
of group-based hierarchy, SDO will interact as both cause and effect with other aspects of
the system to give it a high level of stability. See Pratto, supranote 55, at 252 (explaining
that SDT does not situate "the cause of group dominance in a few deviant, abnormal,
exceptionally high SDO people," because "to do so would paint the psychological states that
sustain group dominance as far more aberrant and unusual than they are" given that "the
everyday normal discriminatory social patterns of group dominance societies and tacit
tolerance of oppression by everyone accomplishes much of the work that sustains group
dominance"). What also follows from the contextual nature of SDO is that the effect of SDO
on HE behavior is not dependent on some absolute threshold level of SDO. Rather, those
with comparatively high levels of SDO in a given context will tend to act to preserve the
hierarchy to a greater degree. See id. at 205. Still, while contextual factors may influence
absolute SDO levels, people's tendency to be comparatively high vs. low in SDO is generally
fairly stable over time. See Sidanius et al., supranote 50, at 850-51.
98.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
99.
See, e.g., Nour S. Kteily et al., Hierarchy in the Eye of the Beholder:
(Anti-)EgalitarianismShapes Perceived Levels of Social Inequality, 112 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 136, 142 (2017); Ho et al., supra note 53, at 1014 tbl.5; Arnold K. Ho et aL.,
Social Dominance Orientation: Revisiting the Structure and Function of a Variable
PredictingSocial and PoliticalAttitudes, 38 PERSONALITY & Sop. PSYCHOL. BULL. 583, 594

tbl.5 (2012).
100.
Kteily et al., supra note 99 (Supp. Pt. 10); Id. at 142 & tbl.1. These statements
were part of an index scale that also included statements about integration in society and
schools. Id. This index score was strongly and negatively related to SDO-i.e., higher SDO
meant more opposition to antidiscrimination policy. Id. at 142 & thl.1. Previous research
had found consistent results with similar scales. See, e.g., Ho et al., supra note 53, at 1014
tbl.5.
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in society. 1 1 Higher levels of SDO have also been connected to
perceptions that greater racial progress has been achieved since
the 1960s, and that racial remediation is a zero-sum affair in
02
which gains for minorities must involve losses for whites.
Higher SDO also seems to lead people to dislike black, but not
03
white, workers claiming to have been discriminated against,
likely because "discrimination claims made by members of racial
minority groups potentially question the legitimacy of the racial
hierarchy, [and thus] perceivers relatively high in anti-egalitarian
sentiment react in a particularly negative manner toward such
claimants." 1 4 As Part II explains, such hierarchy-enhancing
views about the "facts" of discrimination underwrite significant
parts of why current workplace race discrimination doctrine is so
hostile to the interests of workers of color, but comparatively
friendly to the interests of white workers and most employers.
Finally, SDT research suggests that motivations to maintain
hierarchy should play a significant role in how judges choose
ideological justifications to support their interpretation of the
law. 0 5 Judges, especially appellate judges, support doctrinal

101.
Kteily et al., supra note 99, at 142.
102.
See Richard P. Eibach & Thomas Keegan, Free at Last? Social Dominance, Loss
Aversion, and White and Black Americans'DifferingAssessments of Racial Progress, 90 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 453, 461-62 (2006).
103.
See Miguel M. Unzueta et al., Social Dominance OrientationModeratesReactions
to Black and White DiscriminationClaimants, 54 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 81, 85
(2014).
104.
Id. at 87. Such pro-hierarchy tendencies need not manifest themselves
consciously to be operative. SDT research has also found that people with comparatively
high SDO levels may be especially likely to favor dominant groups and their interests
implicitly when the hierarchy is under threat. See, e.g., Felicia Pratto & Margaret Shih,
Social Dominance Orientationand Group Context in Implicit Group Prejudice, 11 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 515, 516-18 (2000) (finding that high SDO study participants are more likely to
implicitly discriminate against outgroups when their status is under threat); see also
Pratto, supra note 55, at 234-35. The limited direct evidence that exists on actual judges
shows that judges, like the rest of the population, have implicit racial biases (generally in
favor of whites) and that these biases can impact their decision-making--though the exact
relationship between implicit judicial bias and judicial decision-making requires further
investigation. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial
Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1195, 1210-26 (2009) (examining implicit bias against
blacks and its potential influence on criminal sentencing for offenses such as shoplifting,
robbery, and battery); Justin D. Levinson et al., Judging Implicit Bias: A National
Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63, 103-11 (2017) (examining,
among other things, implicit bias against Asian Americans and its potential influence on
white-collar crime sentencing); cf. Eyer, supra note 10, at 1325 ("[E]xisting findings from
the judge context... strikingly support the conclusion that most of the time psychology
studies will provide a helpful basis for understanding real-world adjudicative behavior.").
105.
See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (explaining that in the SDT
framework ideologies serve as justifications that mediate the relationship between people's
motivations to maintain hierarchy and their support for social policies). See also supranote
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rulings with legal principles and ideologies that are meant to give
consistent guidance on how similar types of cases ought to be
resolved. SDT suggests that these ideologies will tend to be
l
than hierarchy-attenuating, '6
rather
hierarchy-enhancing
10 7
particularly when the hierarchy is being threatened.
In the context of race discrimination law, the ideology of
colorblindness, in particular, plays a significant role.108 Research
relating SDO and colorblindness suggests a complex relationship
between general support for hierarchy maintenance and
endorsement of colorblindness, in part because the meaning of
"colorblindness" is highly indeterminate. Colorblindness could be
interpreted as a distributive justice commitment to more equal
(i.e., colorblind) societal outcomes, in which case it would function
as a HA ideology; but it could equally be interpreted as a
procedural justice commitment to formally equal treatment,
irrespective of its outcomes, in which case it has the tendency to
perpetuate existing hierarchical distributions of social resources
and would function as a HE ideology. 1°9 Thus, the particular
rationale underlying a commitment to colorblindness, the way in
which colorblindness is framed, is important to its relationship
with SDO.
What existing research suggests is that people who are higher
in SDO endorse procedural understandings of colorblindness
strategically to protect existing hierarchy, particularly when that
racial hierarchy is under threat. 110 For example, Knowles and
colleagues found that (1) white Americans with high SDO levels
were more likely to construe colorblindness as a procedural justice
mandate when experiencing racial intergroup threat;"' (2) they
were more likely to endorse colorblindness when feeling under
threat; 112 and (3) it was a desire for procedural justice that made
85 and accompanying text (arguing that law can be conceptualized as a form of social policy
within the SDT framework).
See supra Section .A4.
106.
107.
See supra note 104; infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
108.
For insightful analyses of the role of conservative judicial appeals to
colorblindness in shaping equal protection doctrine in a way that subordinates the interests

and claims of racial minorities, for example, see the works of Ian Haney-L6pez infra notes
260 and 298.
109. See, e.g., Knowles et al., supra note 68, at 859-60.
By contrast, if colorblindness is framed and understood as a distributive justice
110.
concept, support for colorblindness may be higher among people with low levels of SDO.
111.
Conversely, high and low SDO participants were equally likely to construe
colorblindness as procedural versus distributive justice mandates when not under threat.

See Knowles et al., supranote 68, at 860-62, 862 fig.1. Notions of threat could be effectively
induced even by simply asking white Americans to self-identify their race. See id. at 860.
112.
Id. at 861-64.
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high-SDO whites more likely to endorse colorblindness when
feeling under threat. 3 In other words, '"rather than rejecting color
blindness-an ideology widely accepted as a moral imperativewhen the status quo is threatened, antiegalitarian White people
construe it in a fashion that furthers their hierarchy-enhancing
goals."114
All of these findings converge towards suggesting that,
overall, judges should be more motivated to maintain a
hierarchical status quo-influenced by perceptions of low existing
social inequality, a zero-sum view of remediation, a negative view
of discrimination claimants of color, and ideologies of procedural
colorblindness. This Article argues that these dynamics manifest
themselves in asymmetrical narrowingand proof asymmetry. Part
III will show how this process is reflected in disparate treatment
race discrimination law, how this has made existing doctrine
fundamentally asymmetrical to the detriment of workers of color,
and how doctrinal forks along the road were taken to arrive at this
outcome.
5. Important Contributions of SDT. Before I engage in this
analysis, however, I do want to state clearly that in making my
arguments in this Article, my point is not that SDT concepts can
provide all the answers or fully explain the incredibly complex
process of judging. I don't believe there is a single theory, social
psychological or otherwise, that can do so. Nor do I believe that
SDT could reliably predict the decision-making of individual

113. Id. at 864-66. Significantly, in the study that provided evidence for point (3), the
threat to the hierarchy was induced by telling readers that "contrary to popular opinion,
recent research has found that affirmative action policies have resulted in fewer economic
opportunities for Whites." Id.at 864-65. The trend among low SDO participants was in the
opposite direction to that of high SDO participants. While overall more supportive of ideas
of colorblindness as a general matter, they were less likely to construe colorblindness in
procedural justice terms and became less supportive of colorblindness and procedural
justice when the hierarchy was under threat. Id. at 864 fig.2, 865 fig.3, 866 fig.4.
114. Id. at 867. Similarly, Chow and Knowles found in one of their other studies that
participants high on the SDO-E subdimension, which is predictive of preferences for subtle
means of protecting existing hierarchy, see supra note 53, were more likely to endorse
colorblindness (there defined as opposing government collection of racial data and
governmental classification of individuals by race) when they were made to feel that the
hierarchy was under threat by reading about an organization described as wanting to
achieve equality between blacks and whites through the promotion of strong affirmative
action programs and reparations for slavery than when reading about a nonthreatening
organization. See Rosalind M. Chow & Eric D. Knowles, Taking Race Off the Table: Agenda
Setting and Support for Color-BlindPublic Policy, 42 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
25, 28-29, 29 fig.1. Low SDO-E participants, on the other hand, were less likely to support
colorblindness under those circumstances compared to the control condition. Id.
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judges in individual cases with all of their complexity. 115
Nevertheless, in trying to understand the complex web of reasons
for how laws operate, and how they are interpreted and applied,
SDT has a significant role to play.
In looking to SDT to help explain the contours and outcomes
of employment discrimination law, the goal is not to displace other
useful insights, but rather to "add an additional explanatory layer
to [obtain] the deepest understanding of persistent inequalities
among social groups."" 6 There are clear benefits that come with
mobilizing SDT in this effort.
For one, there is good reason to believe that SDT is
particularly well-suited to inform our analysis of how employment
discrimination law is interpreted. SDT foregrounds an important
motivational dimension of how people behave when relations
between salient social groups are at issue: they often act to a
significant extent in accordance with general human tendencies to
want to establish and maintain group-based hierarchical social
systems. As noted above, research in the SDT tradition has
provided powerful evidence that this psychological tendency exists
as such; that it motivates the behavior of dominant group
members to a greater extent; and that it manifests itself in support
for a wide range of ideologies and behaviors that serve to maintain
group-based hierarchy, particularly when the hierarchy is
threatened. The interpretation of employment discrimination law,
and antidiscrimination law more broadly, revolves in significant
part around whether existing group-based hierarchy, and the
position of different groups within it, is appropriate. This
interpretation is done mostly by dominant group members; is
based on ideologies and assumptions about the extent and
appropriateness of existing hierarchy; and allegations of
discrimination threaten the legitimacy of such hierarchy,
particularly when raised by members of disadvantaged minority
groups. Thus, SDT's findings are highly relevant and directly
tailored towards helping to explain judicial behavior in this space.
115. As legal scholar Gary Blasi and social psychologist John Jost have stated in
support of an argument for applying a different social-psychological theory, that of System
Justification Theory, to the analysis of law: "To posit the existence of a motive is not to
presume a specific result in every case." Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification
Theory and Research; Implicationsfor Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF.
L. REV. 1119, 1137 (2006). I concur with their assessment, and my arguments should not
be read to suggest that predictions that can be made on the basis of SDT, or factors that
have been identified by SDT, will always be relevant or will be determinative in all
circumstances.
116. Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias and the Pushback from the Left, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1139, 1147 (2010).
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Moreover, the judicial interpretation that has led to the racial
asymmetry in employment discrimination law that I analyze in
Part III does not involve the kind of behavior for which cognitive
explanations, including implicit bias, are most persuasive.
Cognitive explanations such as implicit bias are particularly
situations
where . the
decision-maker
applicable
to
'lacks... motivation, time, or cognitive capacity," is "physically or
mentally fatigued," or has to make an "inherently ambiguous"
decision. 117 By contrast, the judicial decision-making that I
analyze in this Article often involves considered choices about
baseline assumptions that the doctrine should make regarding the
continued persistence (or not) of discrimination, the relative need
for antidiscrimination intervention, and the relative strength of
the interests of different participants in employment
discrimination cases (workers of color, employers, white workers).
SDT researchers have made specific findings as to how the
motivation to create and maintain group-based hierarchy
influences such choices. Thus, SDT-based research is a
particularly helpful tool when analyzing legal decision-making in
hierarchy-relevant contexts like employment discrimination law.
Taking
hierarchy-related
motivational
psychological
processes seriously is even more important when race
discrimination is at issue. As numerous scholars have illustrated,
the history of race relations in the United States is one of creating,
maintaining, managing, enforcing, and contesting racial
hierarchy, including through law. 118 If there is an area of American
117.
See, e.g., Erik J. Girvan, When Our Reach Exceeds Our Grasp:Remedial Realism
in AntidiscriminationLaw, 94 OR. L. REV. 359, 374-75 (2016) (citations omitted).
118.
See, e.g., WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OvER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812, at 321-25 (1968) (discussing compromises made on
slavery in the framing of the Constitution); IRA KATZNEISON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
(2005) (describing the role of Southern senators in structuring New Deal legislation such
that it would least interfere with ability of Southern states to maintain system of
institutionalized and legalized segregation); NELL IRVIN PAINTER, THE HISTORY OF WHITE
PEOPLE 65-66, 71 (2010) (providing examples of racial classification schemes of "race
scientists" inevitably ordering racial groups into clear hierarchical systems); DAVID R.
ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING
CLASS 144-50 (rev. ed., 2007) (discussing the dynamics between two subordinated groups
in racial hierarchy, blacks and the Irish, in the context of the formation of working class
identity in white-supremacist nineteenth century United States); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN,
THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF How OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED
AMERICA 43-48 (2017) (analyzing the role of law and government-sponsored residential
segregation in maintaining racial hierarchy in United States); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness
as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1715-16, 1724, 1731 (1993) (discussing whiteness as
a concept akin to traditional property interests that is grounded in white supremacy, the
development of slavery, and the dispossession of Native Americans, and how it is
maintained in various ways through law).
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law in which the findings of SDT are especially likely to have
explanatory power, it should be race discrimination law. Thus,
since existing approaches, such as implicit bias research, have
made important findings on the basic psychological processes that
influence judges in particular circumstances, but leave a
significant amount of variance in the highly complex area of
discrimination-related behavior unexplained; 119 and since we are
often unable to directly investigate the psychological tendencies of
the judiciary; looking to directly applicable social psychological
findings from SDT is highly valuable in explaining the shape of
legal doctrine particularly when, as I show in Part III, the doctrine
aligns with predictions we can fairly make based on those
findings. 12o
Consider one brief example that I believe illustrates how an
SDT-informed analysis of employment discrimination law can be
complementary to, and go beyond, what has already been
proposed. In a 2012 article, Professor Katie Eyer provided a
thorough analysis of potential reasons for the poor odds of
discrimination plaintiffs, including employment discrimination
plaintiffs. 121 Eyer argued that social psychology scholarship on
attribution can help explain these poor odds, 122 and in particular
two phenomena: the well-documented tendency of people to
hesitate to attribute a bad event to discrimination if they strongly
believe in meritocracy; and the tendency to believe that
discrimination (as generally understood) is relatively rare, making
discrimination less cognitively accessible and thus leading people
to be less likely to attribute a bad event to discrimination. 123 An
analysis grounded in SDT is complementary-and provides

119.
See, e.g., Rachlinski, supranote 104, at 1201-02 (reviewing research findings that
implicit bias may account for roughly six percent of variation in white-black interracial

behavior); see also Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Statistically Small Effects of the Implicit
Association Test Can Have Societally Large Effects, 108 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
553, 560 (2015) (reviewing findings of different meta-analyses, finding that regardless of
approach in selecting relevant studies, more than four percent of discrimination-related
variation can be accounted for and explaining how even small statistical effects can have
large social consequences when affecting large numbers of people or the same person

repeatedly).
120.
Cf. Eyer, supra note 10, at 1322 ("[fln the absence of (rarely available) direct
studies on judges or jurors--there are few more persuasive indicators of a common
underlying cause [for the difficulties faced by employment discrimination plaintiffs]

than... phenomenological overlap between the findings of psychology scholars and the
pattern of decisions in the courts."); Girvan, supra note 40, at 75-76 (encouraging analysis
of how SDO may influence judges).

121.
122.
123.

Eyer, supra note 10.
See, e.g., id. at 1291-93.
Id. at 1293-318.
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additional insights--to Professor Eyer's helpful work. For one,
such an analysis can provide greater specificity in certain contexts.
As SDT research has shown, people's willingness to believe that
discrimination and hierarchy are relatively rare is not randomly
distributed-rather, it varies by a person's SDO level. 124 This
finding allows us to go beyond Eyer's analysis, which shows that
judges generally should be comparatively unwilling to make
discrimination attributions. 125 SDT suggests that particularly
those judges who are likely to have high SDO levels, for example
because they are from dominant groups, should be even more
unwilling compared to judges who are likely to have lower SDO
levels, for example because they are from nondominant
backgrounds.
As a result, an SDT-informed analysis can more
parsimoniously explain some of the findings that have been made
regarding the role of a judge's race in deciding employment
discrimination cases. While the findings are not perfectly
consistent, there are a number of studies that suggest that judges
from racial minority backgrounds, particularly black judges, are
significantly more likely to find in favor of employment
discrimination plaintiffs than white judges. 126 In other words,
judges in these studies were not all equally unlikely to make
attributions to discrimination. Rather, those most likely to have
low levels of SDO, and thus hierarchy-attenuating views, were
significantly more likely to make such attributions. Thus,
consistent with SDT-based predictions, these judges were more
likely to act in hierarchy-attenuating ways and rule in favor of
plaintiffs that challenged employment discrimination, even in the
face of a hostile doctrine. . This analysis is not necessarily
inconsistent with that of Professor Eyer, but it helps build on that
analysis and provides even greater specificity.
As I describe in Part Ill, SDT-infused analysis provides useful
insights in helping to explain important aspects of the content and
underlying logic of employment discrimination doctrine as well.
Thus, it should be considered a valuable analytical tool for
lawmakers, judges, academics, and advocates alike. Before moving
124.
125.
126.
Judges'

See infra notes 201-09 and accompanying text.
See Eyer, supra note 10, at 1324-27.
See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, Representationon the Courts? The Effects of Trial
Sex and Race, 69 PoL. REs. Q. 788, 793-94, 794 fig.2 (2016) (finding that in

employment discrimination cases brought by the EEOC, black judges were significantly
more likely to find in favor of plaintiffs in both race and sex discrimination cases); Weinberg
& Nielsen, supranote 12, at 342 (finding minority judges significantly less likely to grant
summary judgment for defendant in broader set of employment discrimination cases);
Chew & Kelley supra note 33, at 100 tbl.1 (showing that African-American judges are

significantly more likely to rule in favor of racial harassment plaintiffs).
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to my SDT-informed doctrinal analysis, however, Section II.B
briefly introduces the concepts of "framework critique" and
"baseline errors" that I will also mobilize in evaluating existing
doctrine in Part I.
B. Framework Critique and Baseline Errors
Combined with analytical tools from SDT, this Article applies
a so-called "framework critique," a concept that has played an
127
important part in the work of Critical Race Theory scholars.
Such a critique recognizes that "the frameworks we use to
understand and describe social facts are constructed in the context
of p rticular political and social activities and projects," and in the
context of race and the law, frameworks of "equality" may serve to
"reinforce[] racial privilege as part of a broader conservative
project to limit a wide-ranging redistribution of resources along
racial lines."'12 8 In other words, the frameworks within which we
debate questions of racial equality, and the starting points from
which we measure the existence of such equality, are ideologically
contingent. In many cases, existing frameworks in the law "do
conservative political work in the context of particular historical
periods to protect white interests."'129
Noah Zatz recently applied this kind of critique to Title VII in
analyzing the frequent use of the often ill-defined term "special
treatment" by courts and scholars when discussing discrimination
cases, 13° and in the process explained the important concept of
"baseline errors." Zatz argues that an accusation that a particular
employer action, or perhaps a court order, that treats employees
from different racial groups non-identically involves "special
treatment" (an accusation that generally tries to suggest that the
treatment is itself discriminatoiy) 13 cannot be appropriately
"relevant
establishing
the
analyzed
without
first
nondiscriminatory baseline."13 2 Where race discrimination has
affected the status quo distribution of employment benefits, this
nondiscriminatory baseline should be "the world as it would have
been without" the discrimination. 13 3 In such situations, treating
127.
See Devon W. Carbado & Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets Social
Science, 10 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 149, 157-58 (2014).
128.
Id. at 157.
129.
Id. at 158.
130.
See Noah D. Zatz, Special Treatment Everywhere, Special Treatment Nowhere, 95
B.U. L. REV. 1155, 1158 (2015).
131.
Id. at 1156.
132.
Id. at 1158.
133.
Id. at 1162-63.

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

1068

56:5

employees from different racial groups non-identically may well be
remedial rather than discriminatory, i.e., "not merely
nondiscriminatory, but antidiscriminatory: necessary to remedy
discrimination' 3 4 if the non-identical treatment helps to recreate
the nondiscriminatory baseline from which discrimination caused
a deviation.'1
To disregard the relevant nondiscriminatory baseline and
assume instead that a discriminatory status quo, i.e., "the world
created by [the] discrimination," 13 6 is the nondiscriminatory
baseline is to commit a "baseline error"137 that confuses
remediation
with
discrimination
based
on
"decontextualization."' 3 8 Acting on such a baseline error, in turn,
not only enables the denigration of remedial action as
inappropriate "special treatment," but also tends to normalize
inequalities that stem from discrimination:
When the benefits of discrimination against others are taken
as a baseline entitlement, an intervention's remedial
character becomes invisible.. Instead, that equalizing
intervention looks like special treatment, raw redistribution
away from members of a dominant group who earned their
place at the top. This dynamic simultaneously shields
discrimination's beneficiaries from acknowledgement of
their windfall and derogates discrimination's victims as
39
undeserving when they receive relief.
This Article argues that a significant portion of current Title
VII disparate treatment doctrine proceeds from such a baseline
error and consequently leads to asymmetrical outcomes that
disfavor workers of color and entrench racial hierarchy in the
workplace. This baseline error is to take prevailing-and
historically persistent-racial inequalities that subordinate
workers of color as normal and presume such inequalities to be the
result of nondiscriminatory
decisions.'4° As a result,
discrimination against such workers is perceived as the exception,
134.
Id. at 1158-59.
135.
Id. at 1158-64 (giving examples of such remedial scenarios, including cases in
which making distinctions between workers based in part on their race is necessary to
identify the victims of prior discrimination who are entitled to a remedy for that

discrimination).
136.
137.

Id. at 1162.
Id. at 1164.

138.

Id. at 1157-59.

139.

Id. at 1157.

140.

See generally Nancy Gertner, Losers' Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 110-11

(2012) ("[J]ust as empirical studies highlight the stubborn persistence of discrimination at

all levels of jobs and in salaries, federal discrimination law assumes the opposite.... It is
as if the bench is saying: 'Discrimination is over. The market is bias-free.).
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rather than a regular feature of employer decision-making; claims
of discrimination by workers of color are viewed with suspicion,
and employer assertions of nondiscriminatory reasons for
employment decisions are taken as more credible than employee
allegations of discrimination. At the same time, this erroneous
baseline is used to justify the view that white workers should be
protected from '"reverse discrimination" on facially identical (and
perhaps more favorable) terms as workers of color, and that doing
so is merely extending the "same" protective treatment to
everyone. By contrast, affirmative action programs are construed
as deviations from this baseline that require extraordinary
justification because they involve highly problematic "special
141
treatment" and unearned "preferences" for minorities.
I argue that the appropriate baseline would instead be to
recognize that major racial inequalities persist in the American
economy and that these inequalities almost uniformly
disadvantage workers of color. This baseline would recognize that
racial discrimination--even if conceived of by the basic test that
asks whether the outcome for one and the same, say black worker,
would have been different if she had been white--continues to be
the reason underlying such inequalities in enough cases that it is
appropriate to take claims of discrimination by minority plaintiffs
at least as seriously as assertions by employers that they acted for
nondiscriminatory reasons,1 42 and more seriously than claims of
43
white plaintiffs that they suffered "reverse discrimination."
Consider, for example, that notwithstanding Title VIrs now
fifty-year tenure, persistent and large gaps continue to define
America's economy along racial lines. As of the late 2000s, black
and Hispanic men on average earn less than three-quarters of the
earnings of white men, and black and Hispanic women earn
substantially less than white women.'" Black and Hispanic
unemployment has for decades consistently been significantly
higher than white unemployment." 5 EEOC data shows that as
late as 2015, at a national level, minority workers are strongly
underrepresented compared to their share of the labor market in

141.
142.
143.

These arguments are presented and analyzed in greater detail in Part III.
See infra Section II.B.2.
See infra Sections I.B.1, IELB.3.

144.

See Victoria C. Plaut, Diversity Science: Why and How Difference Makes a

Difference, 21 PSYCHOL INQUIRY 77, 79 (2010).
145.

See, e.g., U.S.

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Report 1062, LABOR FORCE

CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND ETHNIC1TY, 2015, at 6-7, 73 tbl.12, 76 tbl.12A (2016),
[https://perma.cc
https'J/www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-ethnicity/2015/pdf/home.pdf
3M4Y-QULS].
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the job categories "Executive/Senior Level Officials & Managers,"
'_irst/Mid
Level Officials & Managers," "Professionals," and
"Craft Workers" but strongly overrepresented in the categories of
"Operatives," "Laborers," and "Service Workers". 1 These labor
market numbers show a clear racial hierarchy that continuous to
disproportionately distribute the most attractive jobs to white
Americans and the most unattractive ones to workers of color.
While there are various reasons for such disparities, race
discrimination continues to be a highly significant contributor.
Audit studies consistently show that racial differences in
employment outcomes do not result solely from differences in
individuals' interests, credentials, or potential, but that being a
member of a racial minority group (or being perceived as such)
significantly and negatively affects one's access to employment
benefits. 147 Such findings have been made across different
locations and levels of job selectivity, showing that racial
discrimination hurts minority workers from the low-wage
economy to jobs requiring college degrees.148 In certain labor
markets, a white job applicant with a criminal record for
possession of cocaine can still do "just as well, if not better" than

146.
See 2015 Job Patterns for Minorities and Women in Private Industry (EEO-1),
EEOC, https://wwwl.eeoc.gov/eeocdstatistics/employment/jobpat-eeol/2015/index.cfi#sele
ct_label [https'J/perma.cc/PF7Q-SV3R] (select "National Aggregate, All Industries" from
the drop-down menu, then click "Go") (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
147.
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal?A FieldExperiment on LaborMarket Discrimination,
94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 996-1006, 997 tbl.1, 1002 tbl.5, 1004 tbl.7 (2004) (conducting a
"correspondence" audit study sending fictitious resumes to employers in Chicago and
Boston and finding, inter alia,that white applicants received callbacks at 1.5 times the rate
of black applicants, that black applicants received less benefit from better resume
credentials compared to whites, that callback differences did not vary much by occupation
or industry involved, and that neither self-declared "Equal Opportunity Employers" nor
larger employers treated black applicants significantly better than other employers).
See, e.g., S. Michael Gaddis, Discriminationin the CredentialSociety: An Audit
148.
Study of Race and College Selectivity in the Labor Market, 93 SOC. FORCES 1451, 1451,1453,
1464-70 (2015) (conducting audit study to investigate role of college eliteness and racial
discrimination in labor market outcomes for college graduates in three separate geographic
regions and finding that "although a credential from an elite university results in more
employer responses for all candidates, black candidates from elite universities only do as
well as white candidates from less selective universities" and that "race results in a double
penalty: When employers respond to black candidates, it is for jobs with lower starting
salaries and lower prestige than those of white peers"); Devah Pager et al., Discrimination
in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field Experiment, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 781-82, 784-86
(2009) (conducting in-person audit study using black, Latino, and white testers applying
for low-wage entry level positions in New York, finding "clear racial hierarchy" so that
"relative to equally qualified blacks, employers significantly prefer white and Latino job
applicants" and "a black applicant has to search twice as long as an equally qualified white
applicant before receiving a callback or job offer from an employer").
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Latino and black job applicants with no criminal background. 149
Such racial disadvantage accumulates over a worker's career,
leaving employees of color more and more behind over timeparticularly at higher levels of education.150 Indeed, a recent metaanalysis of more than thirty audit studies covering a forty-year
period from the mid-1970s to the mid-2010s suggested that hiring
discrimination against workers of color "neither declined over time
nor varied by education level or type of occupation involved."'151
Overall, scholars have noted that across methods of investigation,
"considerable scientific evidence of the persistence of workplace
discrimination is evident in audit studies, grounded labor market
analyses, social psychological research using experimental
designs, and surveys of ordinary citizens." 15 2
Part III shows how significant aspects of current disparate
treatment doctrine do not take this baseline of a racially stratified
American economy into account. As a result, we see a doctrine that
leads to systematic asymmetrical treatment to the detriment of
workers of color and helps maintain a system of racial hierarchy
in employment. Research from SDT scholars gives us persuasive
explanations as to why this is so.

III. DISPARATE TREATMENT DOCTRINE ASYMMETRICALLY
DISFAVORS WORKERS OF COLOR AND HELPS MAINTAIN RACIAL
HIERARCHY
This Part provides three examples of how Title VII disparate
treatment doctrine creates asymmetries in how it treats plaintiffs
of color and in doing so helps maintain racial hierarchy in the
workplace. Two of these examples come from what I call
"traditional" disparate treatment cases, in which plaintiffs claim
that an employer intentionally took an adverse employment action
against them because of their race, while the employer claims that
it took the action for nonracial reasons. I focus on cases proceeding
under the so-called McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting regime.

149.
Pager, supra note 148, at 782, 785.
150.
See Donald Tomaskovic-Devey et al., Race and the Accumulation of Human
Capital Across the Career: A Theoretical Model and Fixed-Effects Application, 111 AM. J.
Soc. 58, 70, 82 (2005) (finding, in a large-scale longitudinal panel study, "substantial career

differences in the earnings of black and white men" that "grow across the career" and are
greater at higher levels of education).
151. BERREY ET AL., supranote 11, at 32 (discussing findings from Lincoln Quillian &
Ole Hexel, Trends and PatternsinRacial Discriminationin Hiring in America, 1974-2015
(Apr. 1, 2016) (unpublished conference paper), https://paa.confex.com/paa/2016/mediafile/E
xtendedAbstractPaper6646/paa_2016_complete submitted.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XRT35ZCC]).
152. Id.
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The third example compares the doctrine governing such
traditional cases with Title VII affirmative action doctrine and
argues that this comparison illuminates another asymmetry
disfavoring workers of color. Throughout, I show how the
framework from Part II helps to persuasively explain why we
should expect such asymmetries to develop. First, however, I
provide some background on relevant disparate treatment
doctrine to set the stage for the critical analysis that follows.

A. DisparateTreatment Doctrine Background
The general idea underlying Title VI's prohibition of
disparate treatment in employment decisions is relatively easily
stated. When an employee brings a disparate treatment claim, the
ultimate fact that she has to prove is that the employer
intentionally discriminated against her in a relevant employment
decision because of a protected characteristic covered by the
statute, including race. 1 In other words, the general elements of
a disparate treatment claim are (1) an adverse employment action;
(2) discriminatory intent; and (3) causation, or a linkage between
intent and employment action. 1 4 Various difficulties arise,
however, when this inquiry is applied in individual cases because
(1) it calls for an evaluation of the decision-makers' mental
states-their motive(s) or intent-which is difficult, if not
impossible, to observe, and thus prove, directly; 155 (2) the employer
usually controls most of the relevant evidence; 156 and (3) human
behavior, and thus employment decisions, are usually motivated
by many different factors, leading to questions about how
important the consideration of a protected characteristic must be
before an employment decision counts as illegal disparate
treatment.157 Trying to respond to these issues, disparate
See, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 258-59 (1981)
153.
(plaintiff has the "ultimate burden of persuading the [factfinder] that she has been the

victim of intentional discrimination").
154.

See Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences Proving Discrimination,79 U.

COLO. L. REv. 1243, 1243 (2008) ('Tere are three elements in a plaintiff's prima facie case
of individual disparate treatment discrimination: (1) the plaintiff suffered an adverse

employment action, (2) the action was linked to the defendant, and (3) the defendant's
action was motivated by a protected characteristic of the plaintiff.").

See Martin J. Katz, The FundamentalIncoherence of Title VIU. Making Sense of
165.
Causationin DisparateTreatment Law, 94 GuO. LJ. 489,,515-16 (2006).
156. See id. at 515-16, 516 n.107.
Senator Case, a major proponent of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, pointedly noted
157.
this problem during the debates leading up to the passage of the law when he stated: "If

anyone ever had an action that was motivated by a single cause, he is a different kind of
animal from any I know of." See Derum & Engle, supra note 19, at 1199 (citing 110 CONG.
RE. 13,837 (1964) (statement of Sen. Case)).
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treatment law has developed a complicated array of legal tests and
rules.
The most common way in which plaintiffs can attempt to
prove unlawful disparate treatment is through one of the more
formalized burden shifting mechanisms that courts have
developed over time. 1' The basic dividing line in this context is
between the analysis established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,16 9 also sometimes called the "pretext" regime, and the socalled mixed motives analysis, also sometimes called the
"motivating factor" regime, that was initially put forth by the
Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins'60 and
subsequently codified in modified form by the 1991 Civil Rights
Act.'61
Under McDonnell Douglas, the analysis proceeds in three
steps: (1) a plaintiff must first establish a very specific type of
prima facie case, which, if shown, creates a mandatory rebuttable
presumption that discrimination occurred; 62 (2) the employer may
rebut this showing by introducing evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action;
and (3) the plaintiff may then try to establish that the reason
offered by the employer was not the real reason for the action, but
rather a pretext for illegal discrimination.16 3 A plaintiff must
succeed in showing that her protected characteristic-for example,
her race-was a but-for cause of the challenged employment

158.

Plaintiffs can technically also prove unlawful disparate treatment through so-

called "direct evidence" of discrimination, that is, evidence that so clearly and directly
shows that an employment decision was made with discriminatory intent that the

conclusion of discrimination does not require any inferences by the factfinder. See, e.g.,
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-12 (2002). However, such evidence is not

only highly unlikely to exist in most cases given the near impossibility of showing the
mental state of an actor "directly" in most non-extreme scenarios, but courts have also been
mired in endless disputes on what actually counts as "direct evidence" in the first place.
See, e.g., Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93
MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2321 n.290 (1995) ("[Ihe various circuits have about as many
definitions for direct evidence as they do employment discrimination cases." (quoting Tyler
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1183 (2d Cir. 1992))). Thus, I do not focus on this

relatively uncommon theory.
159.
411 U.S. 792, 802-06 (1973).
160.
490 U.S. 228, 249 (1989).
161.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) ('[A]n unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other

factors also motivated the practice.").
162. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981).
163.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04. This burden-shifting structure is

analyzed in much greater detail below.
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action. 164 If plaintiffs succeed in proving a case under this regime,
they are eligible for the full slate of remedies available under Title
165
VII, including compensatory and punitive damages.
Under a mixed motives analysis, a plaintiff must only
establish that her race was at least one of the employer's
motivations for a particular employment decision-in other words,
that it was a "motivating factor" for the decision even though there
may have also been other, lawful motivations.' 66 Race need not
have been the but-for cause of the decision. 67 If a plaintiff makes
this showing, the employer is liable for disparate treatment. But,
if the employer can show that it would have made the same
decision even absent the unlawful consideration of race, it can
limit the plaintiff's remedies to declaratory relief, certain
injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. 168
The way in which these two regimes relate to each other, and
to which types of cases they apply, has been disputed for as long
as the regimes have existed. 6 9 This Article focuses its doctrinal
See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976).
164.
165.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2012) ("[The court may... order such affirmative
action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or
hiring of employees, with or without back pay.., or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate."); see also id. § 1981a(a)(1) ("[Tihe complaining party may recover
compensatory and punitive damages ... ."); Ponce v. Billington, 679 F.3d 840, 845 (D.C.
Cir. 2012).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
166.
167.
See Ponce, 679 F.3d at 844.
168.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
For example, until the Supreme Court decision in Desert Palace,Inc. v. Costa, 539
169.
U.S. 90 (2003), most, but not all, courts followed Justice O'Connor's concurrence in the
splintered decision in Price Waterhouse, and held that a plaintiff could only use a mixed
motives analysis upon a showing of direct evidence that a protected characteristic was a
motivating factor in an employment decision. See William R. Corbett, Mike Zimmer,
McDonnell Douglas and "A Gift That Keeps Giving,"20 EMP. RTS. & EMP. PoL'YJ. 303, 30809 (2016). In Desert Palace, however, the Supreme Court held that the mixed motives
analysis was available regardless of the type of evidence used by the plaintiff, and
subsequently many scholars suggested that the McDonnell Douglas regime had thus
become obsolete. See id, at 310; see generally Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of SecondOrder Uniformity in DisparateTreatment Law: McDonnell Douglas's Longevity and the
Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 511, 511 n.2 (2008) (collecting sources making this
argument). However, this prediction did not turn out to be true; courts continue to apply
both frameworks, and it has not yet been resolved under which circumstances each type of
analysis should apply. See Sandra F. Sperino, Beyond McDonnell Douglas, 34 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 257, 260-61 (2013) ("Even though it has been more than 20 years since the
1991 amendments, there has been no satisfactory agreement regarding how the McDonnell
Douglas test intersects with the mixed-motive rubric."); Corbett, supra note 17, at 82
('There are two proof structures under the disparate treatment theory of discrimination: 1)
McDonnell Douglas or pretext; and 2) mixed motives. Among several problems with these
proof structures, the most significant is that no one knows which one applies in any given
case."); see also Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45 & n.8 (1st Cir. 2009) ("The
DesertPalace decision has proved ripe terrain for scholarly debate over how that decision
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analysis 70 on the McDonnell Douglasregime. While the continued
relevancy and vitality of the regime have been questioned by
some, 171 I make this choice for the following reasons. For one,
"courts still rely heavily on the McDonnell Douglas framework in
Title VII disparate treatment cases." 172 The Supreme Court, too,
continues to use the framework in the disparate treatment context
without any suggestion that it has lost its usefulness. 173 Second,
74
even though plaintiffs may bring claims under both frameworks,
there are reasons to think that a significant number of plaintiffs
will choose to pursue their cases only under a McDonnell Douglas
approach to avoid allowing the employer to raise the same-decision
defense and limit the plaintiff s remedies. 75 Lastly, the McDonnell
interacts with the McDonnell Douglas framework.... Suffice it to say that the two
decisions have not been definitively disentangled or reconciled .... ." (citations omitted)).
170.
I return to the mixed motives analysis in greater detail in Part IV below. See infra
Part IV.
171.
See supra note 169 and accompanying text; see also Sperino, supra note 169 at
257 (noting a "gradual weakening of the framework over the past two decades" and that
"[r]ather than casting this test into oblivion, courts are slowly chipping away at its
preeminent place as a proof structure").
172. Prenkert, supra note 169, at 538; see also Judge David F. Hamilton, Address to
the Association of American Law Schools, Section on Employment DiscriminationLaw 2013
Annual Meeting; On McDonnell Douglas and Convincing Mosaics: Toward More Flexible
Methods Of Proofin Employment DiscriminationCases, 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POLY J. 195,
196 (2013) ("[1]n terms of practical effects, the last time I checked, a few weeks ago,
McDonnell Douglas had been cited about 40,000 times and is cited hundreds more times
every month."); see, e.g., Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 641 Fed. App'x 883, 885
(11th Cir. 2016) ("There is more than one way to show discriminatory intent using indirect
or circumstantial evidence. One way is through the burden-shifting framework set out in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, and Ta Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine...."
(citations omitted)). Anecdotally, multiple colleagues of mine who served as federal judicial
clerks recalled applying only the McDonnell Douglas regime when reviewing employment
discrimination cases that came before them.
173.
See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2015) ("We
have also made clear that a plaintiff can prove disparate treatment either (1) by direct
evidence that a workplace policy, practice, or decision relies expressly on a protected
characteristic, or (2) by using the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell
Douglas."); id. at 1353-55 (holding that a plaintiff may prove a disparate treatment claim
asserting pregnancy-based discrimination using a modified McDonnellDouglas approach).
174. See, e.g., Ponce v. Billington, 679 F.3d 840, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The court noted
that they "expect that plaintiffs often will allege, in the alternative, that their cases are
both [a pretext case or a mixed-motives case.]" Id.(quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 247 (1989)).
175.
See supranote 168 and accompanying text. As some courts have expressly noted,
there is a risk for a mixed motives plaintiff that a jury in a close case might "split the baby"
and find in favor of the plaintiff on liability but in favor of the defendant with respect to
remedies under the same-decision defense, leaving the plaintiff without meaningful
compensation. See, e.g., Coe v. N. Pipe Prods., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1097-98 (N.D.
Iowa 2008); see also Zimmer, supra note 154, at 1293-94. While plaintiff-side attorneysmay
still have an incentive to bring mixed motives cases since attorney's fees are available in
such cases even if the defendant proves the same-decision defense, at least one
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Douglas framework is frequently used in reverse discrimination
cases brought by white plaintiffs, and a modified version of the
framework is used to evaluate challenges to affirmative action
programs--both of which I analyze in more detail below.
Accordingly, to provide a more coherent analysis, and recognizing
that there is only so much that can be achieved in a single article,
my focus will be on the McDonnell Douglasframework.
I argue that the logic and application of this burden-shifting
regime creates doctrinal asymmetries that disadvantage workers
of color throughout its various stages, asymmetries that can be
explained when viewed through the lens of racial hierarchy and
the framework established in Part II.
B. Asymmetry Examples
1.
Example 1: The Prima Facie Case and "Background
Circumstances." The first step for any plaintiff under the
McDonnell Douglas regime is to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. The main purpose of this step is for the plaintiff to
bring forward the type of evidence that, if left unrebutted by the
employer, allows for the inference (indeed presumption) that
illegal discrimination more likely than not explains the employer's
adverse action. 176 For example, in McDonnell Douglas, which
involved a discriminatory failure-to-hire claim, the Court
determined that a prima facie showing could be made by
establishing that the plaintiff (1) "belongs to a racial minority"; (2)
"applied and was qualified" for the job at issue; (3) was rejected
"despite his qualifications"; and (4) "the employer continued to
seek applicants" with similar qualifications. 1 77 The Court
recognized, though, that different factual situations may call for
different prima facie elements, 178 and courts have indeed adjusted
the elements for different types of claims. 179 For example, in a case
alleging discriminatory discharge, a court might require a plaintiff
to show that she met the employer's legitimate expectations for
her job, was discharged nevertheless, and the employer sought a
replacement.'i s The goal is to "eliminate [I the most common

commentator has noted that many courts have significantly restricted what they permit
attorneys to recover in such cases. See Katz, supranote 155, at 534-36.
See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981).
176.
177. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
178. Id. at 802 n.13.
179.
See LINDEMANN ET AL., supra note 6, at 2-4 ("Courts adapt the [McDonnell
Douglas] framework to conform to the facts of the particular case.").
180.
See, e.g., Flores v. Preferred Tech. Grp., 182 F.3d 512, 515 (7th Cir. 1999).
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nondiscriminatory reasons for" the allegedly discriminatory
employment decision. 181 After all, when such nondiscriminatory
reasons are not applicable, and the employer provides no other
reason, one can reasonably infer that, rather than acting in a
"totally arbitrary manner," the employer instead acted "more
likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible
82
factors."1
Constant across all formulations of the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case, however, is that membership in a "protected
class" is always its first prong.'83 In a superficial way, this makes
sense; liability under Title VII requires an adverse employment
action that was taken "because of' an employee's race. l 4 Thus, an
employee must be a member of a racial group to be discriminated
against "because of' this membership. However, this prong
becomes more curious if one considers that all racial groups are
protected from race discrimination by Title VII, including white
workers, as the Supreme Court has clearly held. 85 If all racial
groups are protected, every plaintiff can presumably
automatically fulfill this first prong. Does the racial group
membership requirement of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case then do any substantive work in deciding whether it is
reasonable to draw an inference of discrimination from a
particular set of facts?
I argue that the answer depends on what one views as the
relevant nondiscriminatory baseline and, relatedly, one's view
regarding the extent to which different racial groups have been,
and continue to be, at risk of racial discrimination in the
workplace. If all racial groups are at a substantial, or at least
nontrivial, risk of race-based discrimination, then it makes sense
to use racial group membership as such, together with other
common
to
"eliminate[]
the most
elements
tailored
nondiscriminatory reasons for" a particular type of employment
decision, and to conclude that an inference of discrimination is
reasonable when all elements have been proved.'86 Based on such
a nondiscriminatory baseline, symmetrical treatment, i.e., asking

181. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
182. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). That this is the goal of
the prima fade case is not entirely uncontested, and I will return to this point in greater
detail below in Example 2, infra Section III.B.2.
183. Jackson v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 703, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ('The McDonnell Douglas
framework first requires the plaintiff to establish a prima fade case of discrimination by
showing that: (1) he is a member of a protected class .....
184. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
185. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1976).
186. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
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plaintiffs of all racial groups to meet the exact same legal test,
would also be equal treatment. Alternatively, one may think that
members of some racial groups, particularly white workers, are at
a much lower, perhaps negligible, risk of being discriminated
against specifically based on their race. Proceeding from this
baseline, one will not be willing to assume that the fact that a
worker is white makes race-based discrimination the most likely
explanation for a negative employment decision against that
worker, even if the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for
the decision have been eliminated via the remaining prongs of the
prima facie case. Instead, one will require additional evidence
suggesting that an employer took the unusual step (unusual at
least in the American context) to discriminate against a white
worker specifically because she was white. Indeed, not requiring
such additional evidence would be "special treatment" of white
plaintiffs by allowing them to benefit from a mandatory
presumption of discrimination that is not justified by the evidence
87
they have presented.
This is precisely the debate that has played out in the lower
courts. 8 8 More so than in some other contexts discussed below,
some courts have recognized that there is a debate to be had over
what the relevant analytical baseline should be, and what the
corresponding implication is for Title VII disparate treatment
doctrine. The result is a circuit split between courts that favor an
identical legal standard for plaintiffs from all racial groups and
those that recognize that equal treatment of all racial groups
requires white plaintiffs to meet a different evidentiary standard.
On the one hand, various circuits have modified the first
prong of the prima facie case for white plaintiffs and have required
them to meet a so-called "background circumstances" test. 8 9 This
187.

See Angela Onwuachi-Winig, When Different. Means the Same: Applying a

Different Standardof Proof to White Plaintiffs Under the McDonnell Douglas PrimaFade
Case Test, 50 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 53, 79 (1999) (discussing research on widespread racial
discrimination in the workplace to support the "argument that it is unreasonable to infer
discrimination for white plaintiffs based solely upon the last three prongs of the McDonnell

Douglas prima facie case test" and that "[b]ecause white job applicants are generally
favored by employers, it makes no sense for courts to infer discrimination for white
applicants absent a showing that their employer is that unusual employer who
discriminates against the majority"); see also Zatz, supra note 130 and accompanying text

(discussing various possible meanings of "special treatment").
188.
The Supreme Court has not spoken on this issue.
189.
These circuits seem to trace back to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Parker v.
Baltimore & Ohio R Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For examples of circuits that
cited and accepted Parker,see Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67
(6th Cir. 1985), and Christensen v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 767 F.2d
340, 343 (7th Cir. 1985).
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test requires a showing of "background circumstances [that]
support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer
who discriminates against the majority." 19 Some of these courts
specifically recognize that not to apply a modified standard for
white plaintiffs would be to commit a baseline error-to assume
that discrimination against white workers is as likely as
discrimination against workers of color when the realities of the
American economy simply do not support this assumption.
This would, in turn, unjustifiably provide greater (i.e.,
asymmetrical) legal protections to white plaintiffs.'19 These courts
recognize that the equal protection of workers of color and white
workers requires taking into account an unequal baseline
situation in the American economy: given consistent and pervasive
racial inequality in employment favoring white workers,'9 it is
reasonable to infer discrimination (and require the employer to
state its reason for the adverse action) from the combination of the
remaining prongs of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test and
the fact that a plaintiff belongs to a racial minority. It is not
reasonable, without more, to make the same inference for white
plaintiffs.
However, not all courts apply the background circumstances
test. While courts have relied on different reasons to reject the
test, 93 some circuits reject the test using reasoning that directly
190. Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017; see also Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the
Obvious: The Convergence of Traditionaland Reverse Discriminationin Title VH Proof,46
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1031, 1058-59 (2004).

191.
See, e.g., Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679, 684-85 & n.1 (7th Cir. 2003)
("[Plaintiff] argues that this new and different prong imposes an unfair burden to nonminority plaintiffs since a non-minority plaintiff must establish more facts to create the
prima facie case.... However, this court has recognized that discrimination by employers
against white men is a less common phenomenon than discrimination against minorities.
For that reason, in order to gain the substantial benefits conferred by the use of the
McDonnell Douglas test, [i.e., an "inference of discrimination. . . in the absence of direct
evidence of discrimination"] the non-minority plaintiff must be able to plead facts to show
why it is likely in this case, that an employer had engaged in such unusual behavior."
(citations omitted)); Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Invidious racial
discrimination against whites is relatively uncommon in our society, and so there is nothing
inherently suspicious in an employer's decision to promote a qualified minority applicant
instead of a qualified white applicant.... [Tihe background circumstances requirement
merely substitutes for the minority plaintiffs burden to show that he is a member of a racial
minority; both are criteria for determining when the employer's conduct raises an 'inference
of discrimination.' (quoting Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 786 (D.C. Cir.
1986))).
192.
See, e.g., supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text; Onwuachi-Willig, supra
note 187, at 71-80.
193. See, e.g., adimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 160-63 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that
the proper standard is a more generic inquiry requiring "the plaintiff to present sufficient
evidence to allow a fact finder to conclude that the employer is treating some people less
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contradicts the above analysis. These courts insist that the first
prong of McDonnell Douglas must be in all cases, including for
white plaintiffs, the generic requirement of being a "member of a
protected class." For example, the Eleventh Circuit in Smith v.
Lockheed-Martin Corp.19 required only a showing that the
plaintiff "is a member of a protected class (here, Caucasian)."195 In
a footnote, the court made clear that the circuit had "rejected a
background circumstances requirement" and buttressed this
conclusion with the statement that "[d]iscrimination is
discrimination no matter what the race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin of the victim."19
As noted above, courts taking this approach implicitly proceed
from a baseline where white workers and workers of color face
similar risks of race discrimination and the inference of
discrimination from the remaining prongs of the prima facie case
is equally strong for workers of all racial backgrounds. I argue that
this commits a fundamental baseline error that erases the starting
point of continuing racial inequality in the workplace. Through
such "decontextualization," 19 this error doctrinally entrenches the
"baseline entitlement" of white workers to a discriminatory status
quo 98 by giving them access to a mandatory inference of
discrimination based on facts and assumptions that ignore their
dominant position in the racial hierarchy and their favored status
in the workplace. To put the point slightly differently, to the extent
that courts reject the background circumstances test (or, as some

favorably than others based upon a trait that is protected under Title VII" and rejecting the
background circumstances test as among other things, inappropriately heightening the
burden impoied on white plaintiffs and being "irremediably vague and ill-defined").
194. 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011).
195. Id. at 1325 (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 1325 n.15 (quoting Bass v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 256 F.3d 1095, 1102-03
(11th Cir. 2001)).
197. See Zatz, supra note 130, at 1159.
198. See id. at 1157.
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circuits have done, begin to soften 99 or question 2°° it), they
instantiate doctrinal asymmetry that disfavors workers of color.
Findings from Social Dominance Theory connect this
doctrinal debate to people's predispositions towards maintaining
existing racial hierarchy in the American workplace. This research
shows that a person's level of support for the maintenance of
group-based hierarchy, i.e., a person's SDO level, strongly
influences related views regarding how much inequality currently
exists in society-and thus one's choice of the baseline from which
to evaluate claims of discrimination. For example, Kteily and
colleagues recently observed that when they asked study
participants to rate how much power various racial groups had in
American society, people with high SDO scores thought that there
was comparatively less racial hierarchy in America than did lowSDO participants.2 0 1 This perception, in turn, made the high-SDO
participants significantly less supportive of antidiscrimination
policies. ° The authors concluded that "people come to perceive
systematically different levels of inequality depending on how
desirable they believe it [i.e., inequality] to be, '20 3 which in turn
"reinforce[s] their convictions about the types of social policies they
tend to favor."204 In other words, if people are motivated to
establish and maintain hierarchy, they perceive less inequality
(including racial inequality) and thus believe that less egalitarian
intervention to protect the disadvantaged (e.g., racial minorities)
is required.

199.

For example, in an unpublished decision, the Sixth Circuit suggested that what

one would consider "background circumstances" may well have changed over time so that

this showing might have become easier to make compared to the early 1980s, when the test
first appeared. See Smith v. City of Dayton, No. 93-3639, 1994 WL 540666, at *4 (6th Cir.
Oct. 3, 1994) (noting that -relevant facts may include whether the employer has been under
external or internal pressure-for example, from affirmative action goals-to hire more
minorities," that while such "actions are of course not illegitimate in themselves, [ they

may well indicate that the employer's situation is different from the 'background
circumstances' existing at the time of Parker,"and "[tihus, employment actions affecting a
member of the 'majority' that may not have created a prima fade Title VII case under
Parkermight, depending on the circumstances with which the employer is presented, create

such a case today").
200.

See, e.g., Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. CoIL, 314 F.3d 249, 257 (6th Cir. 2002)

(applying the standard as circuit law but suggesting that it "may impermissibly impose a
heightened pleading standard on majority victims of discrimination" and noting "serious
misgivings about the soundness of a test which imposes a more onerous standard for

plaintiffs who are white or male" (quoting Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d
796, 801 n.7 (6th Cir. 1994))).
201.
Kteily et al., supra note 99, at 142.

202.
203.

Id.
Id. at 152.

204.

Id. at 153.
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The flipside of this is, of course, that comparatively more
egalitarian intervention is required on behalf of whites, who as
participants in a flat hierarchy are perceived to be at an equal risk
of racial discrimination. SDT research has made empirical
findings in this regard as well. For example, Eibach and Keegan
found that white Americans were significantly more likely to think
about racial progress in zero-sum terms (i.e., progress for some
means losses for others) than racial minorities. 2 5 In turn, white
participants with greater zero-sum thinking judged the level of
progress made towards racial equality since the 1960s as the
highest among all participants. 2 6 SDO also predicted both
sentiments: higher levels of SDO correlated with perceptions of
greater racial progress since the 1960s, and high-SDO participants
found it much easier to come up with examples of how "minority
progress had harmed Whites" than ways in which racial progress
helped whites. 20 7 In other words, whites and individuals with high
SDO appear to see the country further along in creating racial
progress-progress which they view as entailing losses for them.
This view can easily translate into a belief that whites are
victimized by racial progress, and that there is both less need for
the law to intervene to protect minority groups and a greater need
to intervene on behalf of whites. Research by Michael Norton and
Samuel Sommers confirms that whites increasingly see
themselves as victims of discrimination. 2 °8 Asking their
participants to rate the level of discrimination that both white and
black Americans have faced in each decade from the 1950s to the
2000s, they found that white Americans believed that by the
2000s, whites on average experienced greater levels of antiwhite
bias than black Americans experienced antiblack bias.2°9
These research findings are arguably reflected in court
decisions that reject the background circumstances test. Judges
faced with deciding whether to apply the test are making a
doctrinal choice that is not predetermined. The Supreme Court
205. See Eibach & Keegan, supra note 102, at 459.
206. Id. at 459-60.
207. Id. at 461-62.
208. See Michael L Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum
Game That They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. Sci. 215, 217 (2011).
209. Id. at 216. Indeed, "[b]y the 2000s, some 11% of Whites gave anti-White bias the
maximum rating on our [10-point] scale in comparison with only 2% of Whites who did so
for anti-Black bias." Id. Norton & Sommers also found that whites appear to take a strong
zero-sum view of racial bias, so that "within each decade and across time, White
respondents were more likely to see decreases in bias against Blacks as related to increases
in bias against Whites... whereas Blacks were less likely to see the two as linked." I& at
217.
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has not spoken on this issue apart from noting that the elements
of the prima facie case should require "evidence adequate to create
an inference that an employment decision was based on an illegal
discriminatory criterion."21 0 Some judges reject the background
circumstances test because they think that it inappropriately
heightens the burden of proof for white plaintiffs 21 1 and requires
an adjusted approach towards claims of discrimination by whites
212
when they suffer the same discrimination as racial minorities.
This is a view of the American workplace in which existing
inequality and hierarchy are low, and dominant group members,
such as white males, are subject to significant amounts of
discrimination. This view proceeds from a baseline error and, as
research on SDT shows, is characteristic of attempts to support
and maintain group hierarchy. Judges accomplish such hierarchy
maintenance through proof asymmetry when they reject the
background circumstances test and apply a legal test that makes
it comparatively easier for hierarchy-enhancing individualswhite reverse-discrimination plaintiffs-to prove their case.
This doctrinal move to implement proof asymmetry can have
downstream effects that directly and negatively affect the ability
of workers of color to remedy existing hierarchy in the workplace.
Consider Ricci v. DeStefano.21 3 In Ricci, a group of mostly white
firefighters sued the City of New Haven when the City refused to
certify the results of a firefighter promotional exam, which would
have disproportionately excluded black firefighters from
promotions, because it was worried about the design and fairness
of the test and that certifying the results would expose the City to
disparate impact liability. 2 14 The Supreme Court overturned the
City's actions as illegal race discrimination. Importantly, the
majority proceeded from "this premise: The City's actions [in
refusing to certify the results] would. violate the disparate'215
treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some valid defense.
The Court cited no precedent nor much argument for this
proposition. It simply asserted that because the City had taken its
actions in light of the race-based disparity in test results, it had

O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996) (quoting
210.
Teamsters v. United States, 431-U.S. 324, 358 (1977)).
211.
See supra note 193.
212.
See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
213.
557 U.S. 557 (2009).
214.
See id. at 563-75.
215.
Id. at 579, 592. In other words, the Court viewed the facts as establishing
something akin to a prima facie case, though the majority did not expressly phrase it as
such.
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acted "because of race" and thus presumptively violated Title VII's
216
disparate treatment prohibition.
Yet, this position equates merely paying attention to race
(with the intent to avoid unlawful disparate impact on racial
minorities) with unlawful and intentional discrimination against
whites, without requiring any proof that the City actually
intended to discriminate against the higher-scoring firefighters
because they were white-for example, by showing that the
asserted motivation to avoid disparate impact liability was
pretextual. 2 17 In essence, the Court created a "super inference" of
discrimination for the white firefighters based on the strong zerosum view that avoiding harm to black firefighters necessarily
meant race-based harm to whites. As we have seen, such a view
strongly corresponds with the motivation to maintain racial
hierarchy.2 1 8 In so doing, the Court created "racial asymmetry in
the burdens and presumptions of Title VII law" 2 1 9 that "skew[s]
antidiscrimination law in favor of whites as a group."2 0 After all,
"[b]ecause all remedial measures on behalf of racial minorities can
at some level be characterized as racially attentive, treating racial
attentiveness-attending to the racial consequences of one's
actions-as a form of discriminatory motivation destabilizes
virtually all remedial options, even those expressly authorized by
settled doctrine and federal statutory law."2 21 In other words, proof
disparate treatment law that facilitates
asymmetry in
lawsuits
by white plaintiffs becomes the tool to
discrimination
doctrinally operationalize the motivation to maintain racial
hierarchy by enabling challenges to any act of racial remediation
and making egalitarian intervention in favor of subordinate
groups much less likely.
Rejecting the background circumstances test for white
plaintiffs can be seen as creating similar doctrinal drift by
doctrinally exaggerating the risk of race-based discrimination that
white workers face. As Angela Onwuachi-Willig has pointed out,
courts that have rejected the test have made it harder for courts
to screen out, and more expensive for employers to defend, reverse-

216.

Id. at 579-80. The City could defend such race-based action only if it could show

"a strong basis in evidence" that it would have been liable for disparate impact had it not
certified the results. Id. at 584.
217.
See Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci" Whitening
Discrimination,Racing Test Fairness,58 UCLAL. REV. 73, 106-07 (2010).
218.
See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
219.
Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 217, at 107.

220.

Id. at 108.

221.

Id. at 108-09.
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discrimination cases that clearly seem to lack merit. 222 Thus, a
doctrinal choice to reject the test supports the maintenance of
existing racial hierarchy in the workplace by causing employers to
second-guess employment decisions that allocate benefits to
minority workers.
2. Example 2: Employee and Employer Burdens After the
Prima Facie Case. Another example of doctrinal asymmetry
disfavoring workers of color can be found in how steps two and
three of the McDonnell Douglas regime interact. As noted above,
once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer can
rebut it by introducing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the challenged action. If the employer does so, the
plaintiff can try to establish that the reason offered by the
employer was not its real reason, but a pretext for
223
discrimination.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the employer's
obligation to provide a nondiscriminatory reason is limited. It is
only a burden of production, not of persuasion, and the employer
need only introduce some evidence that supports its alleged
reason, "not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by
the proffered reasons." 224 By meeting this burden of production,
the employer "destroys" the mandatory presumption of
discrimination created by the prima facie case. 2 2 Further, even if
a plaintiff succeeds in disproving the employer's asserted reason,
they are not guaranteed to prevail. While a successful prima facie
case, combined with proof showing that the employer's alleged
reason was not its real reason, can be sufficient for a plaintiff to
win, 226 it certainly will not always be. 2 27 In other words, even if a
plaintiff establishes a mandatory inference of discrimination
through its prima facie case, and even if there is additional proof
that the employer's rebuttal reason is not credible (perhaps even
contrived), the plaintiff only succeeds if they can affirmatively
convince the factfinder that the employer's dishonesty was a
pretext for intentional discrimination.22 To put the point another
222.
Onwuachi-Willig, supranote 187, at 81-83.
223.
See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
224.
Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
225.
Id. at 255 n.10.
226.
See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).
227.
See id.; see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
228.
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146-47 (The ultimate question is whether the employer
intentionally discriminated, and proof that the employer's proffered reason is unpersuasive,
or even obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that the plaintiffs proffered
reason... is correct."); Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515-16. As the Court has put it, "[tihe ultimate
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way: The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that there should
be a mandatory finding of discrimination when an employee
provides sufficient evidence for a prima facie case together with
sufficient evidence that the employer's asserted nondiscriminatory
reason is not credible.
In this context, the doctrinal asymmetry that disadvantages
workers of color manifests itself differently than in Example 1.
While the asymmetry in Example 1 stemmed from the relative
treatment of different types of plaintiffs (white plaintiffs and
plaintiffs of color) with respect to the same legal question (what
must be shown as part of the prima facie case), in this Example
the asymmetry is created by the relative treatment between
plaintiffs and employer defendants. This relative treatment is, on
the whole,- asymmetrical to the detriment of workers of color
because it systematically favors defendants in a cause of action
that is prototypically and predominantly asserted by plaintiffs of
color, rather than white plaintiffs. 229 As with the acceptance or
rejection of the background circumstances test, and as I show
below, this doctrinal outcome was not predetermined by Title VII's
text or history, 2 s° nor necessitated as a matter of doctrinal logic.
Rather, it is the result of doctrinal choices by the Supreme Court
that systematically resolved doctrinal ambiguity through
hierarchy-attenuating
than
rather
hierarchy-enhancing
approaches and utilized asymmetrical narrowing and proof
asymmetry to this end. In doing so, the Supreme Court acted to
protect racial hierarchy in the workplace through Title VII
burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
229.

See supra note 13 and accompanying text. As shown in Example 3 below, the

doctrine that applies to cases prototypically brought by white plaintiffs-challenges to
affirmative action programs--is much more plaintiff-friendly.
Some scholars have argued that Title VIrs legislative history reveals a strong
230.
concern with limiting Title VIrs interference with employer decision-making-that the
statute's purpose "was to balance the prohibition of the most obvious forms of
discrimination with the preservation of as much employer decision-making latitude as

possible." Chuck Henson, Title VII Works - That's Why We Don't Like It, 2 U. MIAMI RACE
& SOC. JuST. L. REV. 41, 42, 53 (2012); see also Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast,
The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1490-97 (2003) (discussing
various changes made to the Act while under consideration in Congress. which blunted its

impact). Thus, one may argue that the Supreme Court's decisions on the employer's burden
in the McDonnell Douglasframework merely reflect this purpose by allowing employers to
make decisions based on any reason so long as it is not a discriminatory one. Still, this begs
the question of how the doctrine should determine whether unlawful discrimination was,
in fact, not the reason for a challenged decision when it has been shown that the employer
has not offered a credible explanation in response to a successful prima facie case. A general
statutory commitment to management prerogatives does not necessarily predetermine the

answer to this question.
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doctrine.
Consider how today's rules in this area came about. The
Supreme Court's first major disparate treatment case, McDonnell
Douglas itself, ruled only that after an employer has articulated a
legitimate reason for an adverse employment action, the plaintiff
must be given "a fair opportunity to show that petitioner's stated
reason.., was in fact pretext."231 The Court used various unclear
and perhaps conflicting formulations as to what the precise nature
of the pretext inquiry should be. 232 Thus, the Court left open the
question whether a prima facie case, combined with a showing
that the employer's asserted reason was not credible, would be
sufficient to legally mandate judgment in favor of the plaintiff. In
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the Court
further muddied the waters by stating that upon the employer's
introduction of its asserted reason, the plaintiff "must have the
opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the
true reason for the employment decision," yet also adding that at
the pretext stage "[t]his burden now merges with the ultimate
burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of
intentional discrimination." 233 Equivocating further, the Court
noted that the plaintiff "may succeed in this either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. ''234 In
U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, the Court again
approvingly cited these two methods of establishing pretext 235 yet
also stated that the relevant question at the pretext stage is about
"discrimination vel non,"236 i.e., whether the plaintiff had shown

that the "defendant [had] intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff."23 7 Further complicating matters, Justices Blackmun
and Brennan concurred to explicitly state their view that based on
the above cases, a prima facie case combined with disproving the

231.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
232.
For example, the Court described the question as one of presenting "evidence that
the presumptively valid reasons for [the employee's] rejection were in fact a coverup for a
racially discriminatory decision," id. at 805; of "competent evidence that whatever the
stated reasons for [the employee's] rejection, the decision was in reality racially premised,"
id. at 805 n.18; and of showing that the employer's "assigned reason for refusing to reemploy was a pretext or discriminatory in its application," id at 807.
233.
450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
234. Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05).
235.
460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
236. Id. at 713-14 (footnote omitted).
237. Id. at 715 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
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employer's asserted reason mandated a finding for the plaintiff.23
The Court finally resolved this question in St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, ruling that workers are not entitled, as a matter
of law, to judgment in their favor upon proving a prima facie case
and successfully discrediting the employer's asserted reason(s)though in some circumstances the evidence may still permit them
to succeed upon such proof.23 9 The presumption of discrimination
created by the prima facie case, which "simply drops out of the
picture" upon the employer's production of a nondiscriminatory
reason, does not assert any further influence even if a plaintiff
succeeds in subsequently discrediting the employer's asserted
explanation. 24° Though not as hostile in tone, the Court confirmed
and solidified this basic holding and set the doctrine as it stands
today in Reeves v. Sanderson PlumbingProducts,Inc. 4 1
Within the framework of this Article, one can analyze this
doctrinal history as involving fundamental disputes about the
proper baseline view of the prevalence of discrimination against
workers of color, about the likelihood of employer complicity or
innocence vis-a'-vis such discrimination, and about how, and
whether, the factual likelihood of discrimination is properly
reflected in the prima facie requirements of the McDonnell
Douglas regime. Hicks and Reeves resolved these disputes in favor
of proceeding from a baseline that assumes that discrimination by
employers is insufficiently frequent to justify mandatory judgment
in favor of plaintiffs who pit a successful prima facie case against
a discredited employer reason. In doing so, the Supreme Court
made various doctrinal choices that implement asymmetrical
narrowing and proof asymmetry by both weakening plaintiffs'

Id. at 717-18 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (joined by Brennan, J.).
238.
509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
239.
Id. at 510-11. As the majority noted,
240.
[t]o resurrect it later, after the trier of fact has determined that what was
'produced' to meet the burden of production is not credible, ffies in the face of our
holding in Burdine that to rebut the presumption '[t]he defendant need not
persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons.'

Id. at 510 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254).
530 U.S. 133, 146-47 (2000). Notably, the decision in Reeves (a case under the
241.
ADEA but which applied the McDonnell Douglas framework without modification) was a
unanimous decision with only a short concurrence by Justice Ginsburg. Ginsburg's
concurrence noted only that she expected that there would be few cases in which a prima
facie case combined with discrediting the employer's offered reason would not be sufficient
to find liability, and that the Court should "define more precisely the circumstances in
which plaintiffs [would] be required to submit evidence beyond these two categories." See
id. at 154-55 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). While Hicks had been a deeply contested 5-4
decision, in Reeves no other Justice was willing to continue to disagree with the conclusion
reached in Hicks.
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hands (by limiting the power of the prima facie case) and
strengthening defendants' hands (by extending extreme doctrinal
deference to employers, even if they cannot credibly justify their
decision-making).
With respect to the prima facie case, the Hicks majority
relegated it to a mere "procedural device, designed only to
establish an order of proof and production. '24 2 In other words, the
Court implicitly rejected what it had said fifteen years earlier: that
the prima facie case establishes a mandatory inference of
discrimination because "we- presume these acts, if otherwise
unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration
of impermissible factors."2 43 Under the Hicks view, the mandatory
inference of discrimination that a plaintiff earns when successfully
proving the prongs of the prima facie case does not actually reflect
a substantive judgment that,: absent a credible response by the
employer, discrimination has likely taken place. Instead, it serves
the purely procedural "role of forcing the defendant to come
forward with some response," after which it "simply drops out of
the picture." 2 " Through this reasoning, the Court in essence
codified an implicit conclusion that, notwithstanding the clear
hierarchy that continues to describe the American workplace, 245
enough racial progress has been made that if in, say, a hiring case,
(1) a qualified black applicant applies for an open position, (2) is
rejected, (3) the employer continues to look for other applicants of
similar qualifications, and (4) the employer subsequently cannot
come up with any credible reason why they did not offer the job to
the qualified black applicant, one still need not assume that racial
discrimination was the likely reason for the rejection of the black
applicant.
As the dissent in Hicks pointed out, the Court could have just
as easily made a different decision by changing its assumptions
about the relevant nondiscriminatory baseline. After all, in cases
24
in which the employer's reason has been rebutted, 6
[t]he plaintiff has raised an inference of discrimination

242.
243.
244.
245.

Hicks, 509 U.S. at 521.
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11.
See supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.

246.

In Hicks, for example, the employer had argued that their reasons for demoting

and discharging the plaintiff were plaintiffs "severity and... accumulation of [workplace]
rules violations." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507. The trial court "found that the reasons [the

employer] gave were not the real reasons for [plaintiffs] demotion and discharge." Id at
508. Nevertheless, the court ruled for the employer because it thought that the plaintiff had
not proven that the real reason was racial, rather than personal, animosity. Id. at 508.
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(though no longer a presumption) through proof of his prima
facie case ....Such proof is merely strengthenedby showing,
through use of further evidence, that the employer's
articulated reasons are false, since "common experience"
tells us that it is "more likely than not" that the employer
trying to cover up the illegality alleged by
who lies is simply
24 7
the plaintiff.
The "common experience" referenced by Justice Souter would be

that which recognizes that the realities of continued racial
inequality, hierarchy,

and discrimination

in the American

workplace indeed mandate the conclusion that if an employer
cannot credibly explain why they refused an employment benefit
to a worker of color when the most common nondiscriminatory

reasons for such a refusal are absent, this decision was likely the
result of race discrimination. 248 The Court could have
implemented such a rule of substantive law if it had wanted to.249
The doctrinal moves that a majority of the Court made instead
proceed from a baseline error about the (lack of a) continued
prevalence of racial discrimination in the workplace. 2 5° Such views
about racial progress, the likelihood of discrimination, and the
corresponding need (or lack thereof) to provide antidiscrimination
protections to workers of color can themselves be seen as
expressions of a desire to maintain racial hierarchy. 25 1 The
doctrine created by the court, making it more difficult for workers
of color to prevail, is one way in which disparate treatment law
has been shaped to contribute to maintaining this hierarchy.
247.
Id. at 536 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing Furnco, 438 U.S. at
577).
If courts were to universally apply a robust background circumstances
248.
requirement for white plaintiffs, as discussed in Example 1 above, such a substantive

understanding of the prima facie case would also be appropriate for white plaintiffs who
can meet such a requirement. Such plaintiffs will have made a strong showing that the
otherwise unusual inference of discrimination against a worker because she is white was
appropriate in an individual case. As should be apparent from the discussion in
Section M.B.3 below, however, employer affirmative action programs should not support a
background circumstances finding.
249.
See Malamud, supra note 158, at 2262 n.110.
See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
250.
251.
See supra notes 201-09 and accompanying text. See also Derum & Engle, supra
note 19, at 1220 ("After Hicks, courts are no longer willing to assume that, absent an
explanation, discrimination motivated the defendant employer. In McDonnell Douglas,
Furnco, and Burdine, the Court was willing to risk that employers would be found liable
for discrimination even when the employers really believed there was no discrimination,
and when there was only circumstantial evidence to support the claim. It treated the
statute as a deterrent mechanism-as a tool to make employers more deliberate and less
discriminatory. In contrast, the majority in Hicks was willing to risk that employees who
suffered discrimination would find no relief.").
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With respect to the employer's ability to prevail, the Court
increased doctrinal asymmetry to the detriment of workers of color.
by further buttressing the significant deference to employers and
their presumed good faith decision-making that already underlies
the employer's limited production burden. 252 The Court put in
place a default assumption that even if the employer's asserted
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions is not credible, something
other than discrimination, such as cronyism or personal animosity
between the employer and the plaintiff that is untainted by race,
may well have been the reason for a particular employment
decision. 253 Recall the first vignette from the Introduction. In that
case, both a district and an appellate court found it consistent with
Title VII to reject a finding of race discrimination and credit the
nondiscriminatory reason of personal favoritism even though the
relevant employees had denied that favoritism played a role. This
provides a clear illustration of how far the courts, led by the
Supreme Court, have gone in rejecting a baseline view in which
racial discrimination against workers of color is considered a
strong
possibility,
persuasive
data
to
the
contrary
notwithstanding.
While a full discussion is beyond the scope of this Example, it
bears noting that courts have created various other sub-doctrines
that further fortify the doctrinal asymmetry laid out above and
make it very difficult for plaintiffs to prove that an employer's
25
action was the result of intentional race discrimination. '
'
2
5
5
Examples include the so-called "cronyism defense,
the "stray
2
56
2
57
remarks doctrine,
the "same actor inference,
; the "honest
belief' rule, 25s; and the practice of deferring to "business
judgment," according to which courts have made clear that "courts
must not second-guess an employer's initial choice of appropriate
252.

As Justice O'Connor explained, the limited burden assigned to the employer in

cases proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas framework reflects, at least in part, the
"presumption of good faith concerning its employment decisions which is accorded
employers facing only circumstantial evidence of discrimination." Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 261--66 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).

253.
254.

See Derum & Engle, supranote 19, at 1224-28.
For a more in-depth discussion, see, for example, Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in

Peril,75 Mo. L. REV. 313 (2010).
255.
See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative
Action: A CriticalPerspective on the Distinction Between Colorblind and Race.Consciou
Decision Making Under Title VII, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 1003, 1005, 1017-18, 1021-22 (1997).

256.

See, e.g., Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment

Doctrinein Employment DiscriminationLaw, 77 MO. L. REV. 149, 149-52 (2012).

257.
359-65.
258.

See, e.g., Quintanilla & Kaiser, supra note 19, at 5-6; Martin, supra note 254, at
See, e.g., Flores v. Preferred Tech. Grp., 182 F.3d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 1999).
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qualifications .... 2 59
These doctrinal moves show asymmetrical narrowing and
proof asymmetry in action. They show asymmetrical narrowing
because the doctrinal developments take a broad view of the rights
of hierarchy-enhancing institutions-corporate employers-to
make decisions to the detriment of workers of color as they see fit,
even if they may not be able to credibly justify them. By contrast,
they take a narrow view of the rights of hierarchy-attenuating
individuals-workers of color seeking greater access to workplace
benefits-to not have to suffer adverse employment actions under
circumstances suggesting discrimination. They show proof
asymmetry because the Court adopted doctrinal tests that make it
comparatively difficult for HA individuals-i.e., racial minority
claimants-to win their cases and achieve a HA result (greater
protection for racial minorities in the workplace and compensation
for adverse employment actions taken against them), and
relatively easy for HE institutions--corporate employers-to win
their cases, particularly when the outcome is a HE one (the
justification of an adverse employment action against a worker of
color).
3.
Example 3: Affirmative Action Doctrine. My third, and
final, example of doctrinal asymmetry comes from the area of Title
VII doctrine typically invoked to suggest asymmetry of the
opposite kind, i.e., in favor of racial minorities: the rules regulating
voluntary employer affirmative action programs. 26° In cases
259.
260.

Jackson v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 703, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
By "affirmative action" programs, I am referring to programs in which employers

overtly take race into account when making decisions about which employees to hire,
promote, lay off, admit to training, etc.-usually to increase job opportunities and benefits
for workers of color. I focus on Title VII doctrine regulating when employers can voluntarily
adopt such measures. This is partly because such plans are ostensibly subject to the same
doctrinal analytical structure as "traditional" disparate treatment cases, yet, as shown in
this example, this analytical structure is applied differently between the two scenarios.
Thus, the comparison of affirmative action cases and "traditional" disparate treatment
cases further illustrates the patterns of asymmetry disadvantaging workers of color that
are discussed in this Part. This limitation also recognizes that doctrinal limits for when
courts can order affirmative action remedies, for example, Firefighters Local Union No.
1784 v. Stotta, 467 U.S. 561, 572-74 (1984); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers'
International Association v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 470-71 (1986); and limits set by the
Constitution for nonjudicial state actors, for example, Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986), are complex and deserve separate treatment. I discuss these cases,
and race-conscious remedies such as affirmative action more broadly, in other work. See

generally David Simseon, Whiteness as Innocence, 96 DENY. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019),
https'/papers.ssrn.comlsol3papers.cfn?abstractjid=3173153
[https://perma.cc/HDG7W6X3]. Notably, though, scholars have made arguments about the historical development
of constitutional limits on race-based affirmative action (including outside of the
employment context) that can be viewed as similar to the asymmetry framework I discuss
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deciding the legality of such programs, the tendency of courts (and
disparate treatment doctrine) to be suspicious of claims of race
discrimination and to defer to the wisdom of an employer's
decision-making (as we saw in Example 2) does not manifest itself.
Indeed, the doctrine does quite the opposite. The framework and
research discussed in this Article suggest that this is at least
partially because the law, and many judges, work (consciously or
unconsciously) to maintain existing racial hierarchy. In Example
2, employers were acting in a hierarchy-enhancing role, seeking
outcomes that maintain existing racial hierarchy. Title VII
doctrine is comparatively supportive of and deferential to such
efforts. In this Example, employers who pursue affirmative action
for workers of color are working in a hierarchy-attenuatingrole.
As we will see, and as SDT research helps us predict, the law is
much more hostile to such employers. The hierarchy-connected
tendency to engage in baseline errors again plays a role, but so
does the hierarchy-enhancing doctrinal ideology of procedural
colorblindness that facilitates the framing of affirmative action as
"racial preferences" and "reverse discrimination."
Cases in which white plaintiffs 26 1 challenge raCe-based
affirmative action programs under Title VII are treated as a
variant of disparate treatment cases, and are, in a broad sense,
subject to the same three-step analysis under McDonnell Douglas
as other disparate treatment cases discussed above. 262 The
specifics of what each party needs to show in affirmative action
cases, however, are quite different. To fulfill their prima facie
burden, affirmative action challengers only need to show that race
"has been taken into account in an employer's employment
decision."2m In other words, the. doctrine departs from a starting
point of strong suspicion towards affirmative action programs by
making basically every decision that an employer takes in reliance
on an affirmative action plan challengeable by a (white) plaintiff
who alleges to have been disadvantaged by it. The employer can
in this Article. See generally Ian Haney-L6pez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1779 (2012).
261. It is possible, of course, for workers of color to challenge affirmative action
programs as well. Generally, however, such cases are brought by white plaintiffs and
affirmative action is publicly (and doctrinally) debated as predominantly affecting the
rights of whites. Thus, challenges by white workers are my focus in this Example.
262.
See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1987). While Johnson was
a case in which an affirmative action program with respect to sex was at issue, the Court
made clear that the same standards could be applied to programs involving race. See id. at
635 n.13; see also, e.g., Schurr v. Resorts Int!l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 497 n.ll (3d Cir.
1999).
263. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626.
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rebut this showing by pointing to the affirmative action program
as the nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. 264 The plaintiff
then has the burden of establishing that the employer's reason is
a "pretext 265 by showing that the affirmative action program is
invalid under prevailing judicial doctrine.2 6 For a voluntary
affirmative action plan to be valid under Title VII, it generally
must meet the following criteria: (1) the plan must have a
sufficient factual predicate, which generally means that a plan
must be responding to at least a "manifest imbalance" that reflects
underrepresentation of racial minority members in "traditionally
segregated job categories";267 (2) the plan must not "unnecessarily
trammel the rights" of majority employees; 268 and (3) the plan
must be designed to attain, but not maintain, greater racial
269
balance in the position at issue.
This doctrinal infrastructure provides few incentives, and
many risks, for employers willing to take hierarchy-attenuating
steps by implementing an affirmative action program. For one, the
264.
Id.
265.
The word "pretext?' is somewhat of a misnomer in this context. In "traditional"
cases, as described above, the pretext inquiry is indeed focused on determining whether an
employer is pretending to have made a decision for a nonracial reason when the "real
reason" for their action was racial discrimination. Whether the asserted nonracial reason
is a "good" or savory one is largely beside the point as long as it was the actual reason. In
affirmative action cases, the "pretext" question is not about pretending. All sides may well
agree that the relevant decision was made pursuant to an affirmative action programthough as described below, that can be a risky concession for an employer. Rather, the
question is whether the affirmative action program fits within certain doctrinal limits. In
other words, the "pretext" inquiry is focused on determining the factual existence (or not) of
a particular reason in "traditional" cases, whereas in affirmative action cases it is focused
on evaluating the quality and propriety of the reason (i.e., whether the affirmative action
program fits within the doctrinal boundaries for such programs).
266. Johnson,480 U.S. at 626. The text of Title VII does not speak to the permissible
boundaries of affirmative action programs, which have instead developed through judicial
interpretation. See id. at 627-31; United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197, 201-02
(1979). The Civil Rights Act'of 1991, which amended Title VII, did include a section,
however, which recognized (and arguably approved) the existence of such programs within
judicial guidelines by providing that "[n]othing in the amendments made by this title shall
be construed to affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation
agreements, that are in accordance with the law." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166,
§ 116, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note).
267. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631 (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 197); see also Shea v. Kerry,
796 F.3d 42, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631). This formulation
focused on underrepresentation is particularly relevant for employment decisions involving
hiring, promotion, and admission to training programs. Courts have, at times, dealt with
alleged affirmative action programs in areas such as pay equality and rephrased the
standard accordingly. See, e.g., Smith v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 676 (4th
Cir. 1996) (en banc) (asking whether plan was "designed to eliminate a manifest racial or
sexual imbalance" in pay).
268. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637.
269. Id. at 639-40.
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doctrinal requirements can be difficult to meet, exposing the
employer to significant risk of a lawsuit brought by a disgruntled
white worker. For example, the "manifest imbalance" that is the
predicate for a valid program must show a very significant
underrepresentation of a particular group in the employer's
271
workforce 2 70 compared with the relevant local labor force.
Accordingly, employers who are uncertain whether the
underrepresentation of workers of color in their workforce is
significant enough to be "manifest," or whether they used the right
comparator population 272 or statistical tools 278 to measure the
imbalance, may decide not to take the risk. Further, "manifest
imbalance" is generally not enough. The imbalance must exist in
a "traditionally segregated job category." 274 As some commentators
have noted, this requirement can inappropriately "narrow the
* situations in which affirmative action may voluntarily be used,"
particularly when a job requires special skills. 275 This is because,
in such a job category, the relevant comparator labor force may
well have such a small proportion of minority members that it will
be difficult or impossible for an employer to show a significant
statistical distinction between that labor force and its own
workforce. 276 Courts generally have also not allowed employers to
avoid the restrictive nature of these requirements by seeking to

This requirement is similar to, though slightly more forgiving than, the factual
270.
showing necessary to establish a prima facie case in a disparate treatment case involving a
"pattern or practice" of illegal discrimination, which generally requires either "gross"
statistical disparities, see Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08
(1977), or significant statistical disparities along with anecdotal evidence of individual
instances of discrimination, see International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 337-43 (1977). See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632-33 ("A manifest imbalance need
not be such that it would support a prima fade case against the employer... ."). For
example, where there are substantial, but perhaps not "gross" disparities, an employer
implementing an affirmative action program may not have to provide additional "anecdotal
evidence" of discrimination, when such evidence may be necessary to prove a pattern or
practice case. See id. at 633 n.11.
The relevant local labor force could either be the entire labor market or general
271.
population of the area for jobs that don't require specific expertise or for admission to a
training program, or it could be the labor force with the requisite qualifications for positions
requiring specific skills. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631-32.
See, e.g., Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 313 (remanding pattern or practice case based
272.
on questions regarding proper comparator labor force, the choice of which might determine
whether statistical underrepresentation was sufficient to support plaintiffs case).
273.
See, e.g., Smith v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 676-77 (4th Cir. 1996)
(en banc) (reversing summary judgment for employer because of questions of fact regarding
whether employer's multiple regression analysis used to establish "manifest imbalance"
improperly excluded factors that may have contributed to existing pay disparities).
274.
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632.
275.
See Sullivan, supranote 190, at 1049 n.79.
276.
Id.
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pursue more forward-looking goals than simply eliminating prior
segregation27and instead have required that plans must be broadly
"remedial. 7 While details in this regard are beyond the scope of
this Article, such courts have thus rejected what they considered
non-remedial, forward-looking purposes such as achieving racial
diversity in relevant jobs278 or ensuring that all racial groups
279
receive a fair share of jobs in a developing industry.
In addition, even if meant to address a manifest imbalance in
a traditionally segregated job category, a plan is not valid if it
"unnecessarily trammels the rights" of majority employees. This
could occur, for example, if it imposed rigid quotas, required the
discharge of majority workers, created an absolute bar to their
advancement, or inappropriately unsettled their legitimate
expectations-for example, those stemming from a seniority
system. 2 ° Finally, the courts have made clear that affirmative
action programs must be temporary, meant to attain, not
maintain, greater racial balance in the workforce.281
These requirements further exacerbate the minefield for
employers attempting to implement a plan in accordance with the
law. The difficulty of meeting them is illustrated by the case that
underlies the second vignette in the introduction. In that case, the
court thought the rights of a white employee were illegally
"trammeled" when a school district, which was in financial distress
277.

See, e.g., Schurr v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 497 & n.11 (3d Cir.

1999).
278. The most famous case rejecting a "diversity rationale" for affirmative action in
the workplace is Taxman v. Board of Education, 91 F.3d 1547, 1563 (3d Cir. 1996) ("While
the benefits flowing from diversity in the educational context are significant indeed, we are
constrained to hold, as did the district court, that inasmuch as 'the Board does not even
attempt to show that its affirmative action plan was adopted to remedy past discrimination
or as the result of a manifest imbalance in the employment of minorities,' the Board has
failed to satisfy the first prong of the Weber test." (citation omitted)). Developments in
constitutional law, where the educational benefits of a racially diverse student body can
constitute a compelling interest for affirmative action programs in university admissions

under the equal protection clause, have so far not translated to Title VII, and at least some
scholars expect this to continue for the foreseeable future. See generally Deborah C.
Malamud, The StrangePersistenceofAffirmative Action Under Title VUi, 118 W. VA. L REV.
1 (2015) (discussing the likelihood of the Court extending diversity-based affirmative action
to the Title VII context).
279.
See, e.g., Schurr, 196 F.3d at 488-89, 497-98 (rejecting affirmative action plan by
private employer adopted in response to regulations by the state gaming regulatory

authority because not remedial but instead adopted in recognition of the fact that the
legislature "was also aware Atlantic City had and has a large minority population, and
sought to ensure that the job creation which would accompany casino developments would
benefit all segments of the population").

280.

Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987); see also United

Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979).

281.

See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 639; see also Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
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and needed to lay off employees, decided to modify its initial layoff
plan, firing one less person in order to avoid having to fire its sole
black administrator and suffer a setback to its long-term
affirmative action goals.282 According to the court, the law did not
allow this remedial action because once the district created an
additional position, the expectations of the slightly more senior
white employee to be retained trumped the district's affirmative
action goals.288 Further, the court framed the district's efforts to
keep its only black administrator as one that impermissibly tried
28 4
to "maintain" racial balance.
Some courts have gone even further and ruled that when a
white worker brings a race discrimination claim against an
employer that has an affirmative action program, and there is at
least a factual question as to whether the employer acted pursuant
to the plan in making the decision challenged by the white
employee, they will treat the existence of the affirmative action
program as "direct evidence" of unlawful discrimination and
require a determination of whether the plan is valid.28 Thus,
having an affirmative action plan exposes employers to litigation
by disgruntled white employees even for decisions where it is not
clear that the plan was even a relevant consideration. Given this
risk, an employer might well decide that its commitment to
remedying societal race discrimination does not outweigh the legal
risks attending the implementation of an affirmative action
program.
Superficially, the courts' hostile treatment of voluntary
employer affirmative action is curious. The Supreme Court's
approval of affirmative action under Title VII is explicitly
grounded in preserving employer freedoms, 28 6 and there is reason
to believe that there would have never been a majority on the
Supreme Court to approve affirmative action if it had not been tied
to protecting employer prerogatives. 287 The framework and
282. Cunico v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 917 F.2d 431, 440-43 (10th Cir. 1990).
283. Id.
284. See id. at 440.
285. See, e.g., Humphries v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 580 F.3d 688, 694 (8th Cir.
2009); Bass v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 256 F.3d 1095, 1110-11 (11th Cir. 2001). The similarity
of these rulings to Ricci is striking. See supranotes 213-17 and accompanying text. There,
too, race-conscious remedial action was interpreted as presumptive disparate treatment
that can only be justified by meeting stringent standards of legal justification.
286. See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 206-08 (grounding the argument that Title VIrs
legislative history supports permissibility of private voluntary affirmative action in
legislators' goal to preserve management prerogatives).
287. As Deborah Malamud notes, there is reason to think that it was a distinctly probusiness interpretation of Title VII that secured a full five-vote majority in favor of
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empirical research discussed in this Article, on the other hand,
makes the doctrine look much less curious. It allows us to
understand Title VII affirmative action doctrine as another
example of asymmetrical narrowingand proofasymmetry that, far
from introducing asymmetry favoring workers of color into an
otherwise symmetrical Title VII framework, is part and parcel of
a legal regime that works asymmetrically to the disadvantageof
workers of color. This conclusion becomes clearer when one
compares affirmative action doctrine with the doctrine governing
"traditional" disparate treatment claims discussed in Examples 1
and 2.
"Traditional" disparate treatment cases are most frequently
brought by workers of color 288 and deal with the types of claims
most often relevant to their employment situation--greater access
to jobs and job security, career advancement through promotion,
equal pay, and other employment opportunities and benefits that
are still reserved predominantly for white Americans. In other
words, in such cases, plaintiffs of color seek a hierarchyattenuating outcome through an increased allocation of positive
social value to subordinate groups. Employer defendants seek a
hierarchy-enhancing outcome by stifling this allocation and
preserving the existing hierarchy. The doctrine that regulates
such cases is very defendant-friendly and, unsurprisingly,
plaintiffs of color overwhelmingly lose such cases. 289 They are
assumed by some courts to be no more at risk of discrimination
than white workers, and this erasure of the continued racial
hierarchy in the American workplace can make courts hostile to
employer actions taken in their interests. 29° Even if workers of
color establish a mandatory presumption of discrimination in their
courts
favor and succeed in discrediting the employer's rebuttal,
29 1
are still suspicious of their claims of discrimination.
By contrast, courts grant significant deference to employers
when their actions preserve existing racial hierarchy. Courts ask
little more of employers than to state a reason for such actions that
is not racial animus simpliciter-it need not even be their real
reason, nor is there necessarily a negative consequence if the
asserted reason is not credible. 29 Further, through various subaffirmative action. See Deborah C. Malamud, The Story of United Steelworkers v. Weber,
in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 173, 207-13 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006).
288.
See NIELSEN ET AL., supra note 13, at 18-22.

289.
290.
291.
292.

See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
See supra Section ]II.B.1.
See supra Section m.B.2.
Id.
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doctrines the courts have protected employer "cronyism" that
hurts racial minorities, diminished the probative value of racial
slurs and biased statements, credited employers' "honest beliefs"
even if the employer makes mistakes that disadvantage racial
minorities, refused to second-guess employer "business judgment,"
298
and more.
Yet such deference falls away when the same employers take
hierarchy-attenuating steps and try to allocate positive social
value to workers of color through affirmative action programs.
Courts are wary of that kind of "business judgment," even if it is
made voluntarily. Even though ostensibly subject to the same
burden-shifting regime that applies in "traditional" cases, white
plaintiffs seeking hierarchy-enhancing outcomes in invalidating
affirmative action programs face a much more plaintiff-friendly
doctrine. They can attack an affirmative action program because
the existing allocation of opportunity is perhaps unequal along
racial lines, but not "manifestly imbalanced" enough, or not in the
right job category, to justify intervention. 294 They can attack the
decision-making process by which an employer determined the
existence of the "manifest imbalance" it needs to justify voluntary
affirmative action. 295 They have a right to demand that their
interests are not "unnecessarily trammeled," and that their
expectations for employment advantage are preserved. And even
if an employer clears all of these hurdles with a narrowly designed
affirmative action program responding to clear inequality, the
employer can only use such a program to make steps in the right
direction, but not to preserve its gains. 296 Employers, meanwhile,
face the risk that their affirmative action programs are treated as
297
direct evidence of their unlawful discriminatory intent.
Through such asymmetrical narrowingand proof asymmetry,
disparate treatment doctrine plays its part in maintaining
America's racial hierarchy. And it does so in a highly efficient way:
On the one hand, the highly restrictive doctrine governing
affirmative action programs ensures that employers think twice
about whether implementing a program is worth the inevitable
lawsuit-particularly those employers who may not have
egregious imbalances in their workforce or a long history of
internal discrimination, but who may still be committed to
contributing to the alleviation of racial hierarchy in the American

293.
294.

See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 271-79 and accompanying text.

295.
296.
297.

See supra note 267.
See supra notes 280-84 and accompanying text.
See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
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economy. Under current affirmative action doctrine, there is little
space for such forward-looking programs, and employers may well
decide that adopting them is not worth the potential cost. White
plaintiffs thus need not file many anti-affirmative action cases to
preserve the doctrine's deterrent effect.
On the other hand, the deferential doctrine that applies in
"traditional" disparate treatment cases provides little incentive for
employers and managers to change their thinking or day-to-day
approach to their business even when it clearly affects workers of
color negatively. The burden of making inroads into the continuing
racial hierarchy of the American workplace falls on discrimination
plaintiffs, predominantly from racial minority groups-but they
almost inevitably lose their disparate treatment cases.
Empirical research from SDT researchers is again helpful in
explaining this asymmetry. Perhaps the most common objection to
affirmative action programs is that they involve "preferential
treatment" for racial minorities, and "unearned" preferences at
that. Individuals who would not have gotten a job, promotion, or
training now do get those benefits (and, by implication, whites,
who would have otherwise gotten those benefits, now no longer
do), and this is only because they are racial minorities who are
"preferred" under an affirmative action program. Providing such
preferences is unfair, the argument goes, because they represent
"racial spoils" that are violative of the principle that benefits
should be distributed on the basis of "merit." Accordingly, the legal
system must pay careful attention to such "preferences," to ensure
that they do not, or only to the smallest extent possible, disrupt
the expectations that those who work hard and "play by the rules"
of meritocracy have earned for themselves.2 8
Of course, any objection to "preferences" must be based on an
implicit starting point, a nondiscriminatory baseline, from which
departures can be characterized as "preferential." The objection to
affirmative action as entailing unfair racial preferences relies on
a nondiscriminatory baseline at which little hierarchy remains in
the American workplace, white workers and workers of color are
subject to similar risks of discrimination, and thus "taking sides"

298.
This view is widespread, accepted even by many who (perhaps begrudgingly)
accept that due to past abuses in the treatment of racial minorities in the United States,
some remedial action is warranted--but only as an exception, and only temporarily. See,

e.g., Ian Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities. Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1051-61 (2007). Indeed, even the case that
established the permissibility of afrmative action programs under Title VII, Weber framed

the issue around whether Title VII should be interpreted to allow "racial preferences" under
certain circumstances. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200 (1979).
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between them is arbitrary and discriminatory. 299 As described in
more detail above, findings from SDT research show us that taking
this baseline view is strongly related to greater motivation to
maintain racial hierarchy, 3°0 which we should expect to see in
large parts of the federal judiciary. 301
SDT researchers have made even more specific findings that
connect the differential treatment of white plaintiffs in the
affirmative action context and plaintiffs of color in the
"traditional" disparate treatment context to human tendencies to
create and maintain social, and racial, hierarchy. Consider a series
of studies by Unzueta and colleagues.302 In an initial study, white
participants read vignettes about a [black/white] police officer who
had been passed over for a promotion in favor of a [white/black]
officer and either attributed his failure to be promoted to racial
discrimination or not.w3 The participants rated the "likability" of
the officer, indicating whether they thought the officer was likable,
friendly, had a good personality, and so on. 3" The authors found
that the higher the participants' SDO levels, the less they liked
the black officer claiming discrimination. 3°6
In a follow-up study with a multiracial pool of participants,
the authors investigated similar effects of SDO on hirability
determinations.3 0 6 Asked to imagine themselves as part of an HR
team, participants read about a [white/black] applicant for
employment who had left his previous employer-in one condition
after filing a formal discrimination claim because all promotions
had been given to [black/white] co-employees, and in the control
condition without any mention of his reasons for leaving. 307 The
participants then again rated the applicant's likability and also
rated the applicant's "hirability" by indicating how likely they
would be to interview and hire the applicant, and how likely it was

299. As I have noted above, this understanding does not reflect the reality of the
American workplace. See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.
301. See supra Section IlA.4.
302. See Unzueta et al., supra note 103.
303. See id, app. A (describing the vignettes; in one vignette, a white officer applied for
a promotion for which a black officer was later selected, in the other vignette, all the details
were kept the same, except a white officer was promoted over a black officer).
304. Id. at 83.
305. Id. There was a trend (though not statistically significant) for participants to like
the white officer who claimed discrimination more the higher their SDO level. Id
306. Id. at 84-85. The participants in the study self-identified their race as follows:
Native American: 1; White: 109; Black: 92; Latino: 5; Asian: 20; and multiracial
participants: 3. Id, at 84.
307. Id.
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overall that the applicant would be hired.308 Once again,
participants with higher SDO levels liked the black discrimination
claimant significantly less, and they also deemed the black
applicant who had previously filed a discrimination claim
significantly less hirable than participants with lower SDO
levels.3o9
To sum up, high SDO participants did not simply consider all
potential workers who had previously made a discrimination claim
to be less likable and hirable. They could have viewed all such
applicants as potential troublemakers. Instead, they were racially
specific-it was black, but not white, discrimination claimants
that suffered these negative effects. The authors suggest that this
may well be because "discrimination claims made by members of
racial minority groups potentially question the legitimacy of the
racial hierarchy, [and thus] perceivers relatively high in
antiegalitarian sentiment react in a particularly negative manner
310
toward such claimants."
Disparate treatment doctrine reflects such negative reactions
to workers of color. For instance, recall Example 2 above. Courts
are not willing to hold that a successful prima facie showing,
combined with discrediting the employer's rebuttal reason, should
mandate a finding of discrimination in part because regardless of
the credibility of the reason an employer actually articulated, it is
still possible that personal animosity or another, nonracial,
nondiscriminatory reason "really" explained why the worker of
color lost out. This strongly reflects the findings by Unzueta and
colleagues: higher SDO judges (of which there are likely
numerous) are likely to view discrimination claimants of color as
less likeable, and thus should be more likely to assume that a
reason such as personal animosity, not race discrimination, caused
the worker to lose out on an employment opportunity. This was
precisely what happened in Hicks itself. In that case, a black
plaintiff claimed that his discharge was racially motivated. Even
though the district court determined that the defendant's asserted
reasons for the discharge-disciplinary violations-were not
credible, the court still ruled against the plaintiff. The court did so
because it thought that the plaintiff had not sufficiently shown
that racial, rather than purely personal, animosity had motivated
308.
309.

Id.
Id. at 85: In this study, participants liked the white discrimination claimant

significantly more the higher their SDO level. Id. at 84-85. The white applicant's hirability
was unaffected by a prior discrimination claim. Id. at 85. The race of the participant did
not change this effect of SDO on likability and hirability. Id. at 84.
310. Id. at 87.
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the discharge--even though the employer's agents involved in the
discharge explicitly disclaimed such personal animosity.8 11 Thus,
the plaintiff had not met his burden of persuasion on
discriminatory intent. The Supreme Court validated this doctrinal
interpretation.
Similarly, higher SDO judges are likely to view workers of
color as less hirable, and thus may be more likely to assume that
a lack of qualifications or poor performance, not race
discrimination, caused the worker to lose out. As described above,
much of "traditional" disparate treatment doctrine is built around
precisely such kinds of judgments and thus reflects efforts to
protect existing racial hierarchy. On the flipside, in the affirmative
action context, the doctrine explicitly reflects the higher likeability
of white discrimination claimants seeking to maintain existing
racial hierarchy. The doctrine is explicitly. concerned with their
plight, making sure that only very significant racial imbalances
can justify disturbing their status quo entitlements, and explicitly
demanding that their interests be respected and not
"unnecessarily trammeled." If a greater motivation to maintain
existing hierarchy makes judges view white discrimination
claimants as comparatively more likeable and hirable, those
judges should, in turn, be more likely to find that an affirmative
action program illegitimately disadvantages such "meritorious"
workers by giving to workers of color, less likable and hirable
perhaps, illegitimate and unearned preferences.
Lastly, SDT research can help explain an important
ideological dimension of the asymmetry unveiled by comparing
"traditional" disparate treatment doctrine and affirmative action
doctrine. Another major line of criticism of affirmative action
programs is that they involve racial discrimination (just the
reverse of the "traditional" kind) because they require that race is
considered when deciding who should receive employment
benefits. Doing so involves treating people differently on the basis
of their race-and that is the textbook definition of "racial
discrimination." Unless there is a very good reason for it, we
should not allow racial discrimination of any kind, including the
"reverse" kind, because racial discrimination does not become any
less problematic just because it may seem advantageous for a
decision-maker to engage in "benign" discrimination at a
particular point in time. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin
Scalia have been some of the most outspoken proponents of this
view over the last three decades and have deeply grounded their
311.

St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508 (1993).
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arguments in appeals to "colorblindness," particularly in the
procedural form that considers race to be an inappropriate
8 12
criterion for any decision that distributes social goods.
Of course, as both CRT and SDT research show, appeals to
procedural colorblindness are not neutral with respect to their
relationship to the maintenance of racial hierarchy. Recall the
research of Knowles and colleagues, which found that higher SDO
levels are related to construal of, and greater support for,
colorblindness as a procedural justice mandate under conditions of
racial intergroup threat, including threat induced by minorities
pushing for affirmative action.3 18 The affirmative action doctrine
described above and its characterization as a narrowly limited
exception to an otherwise applicable strong norm of formal equal
treatment reflect a clear procedural justice understanding of the
ideological underpinning of disparate treatment doctrine. This
underpinning can, and should, be understood as a hierarchyenhancing legitimizing ideology that is being mobilized in support
of maintaining existing racial hierarchy in the workplace in
response to the threat to the hierarchy caused by employers
implementing affirmative action programs that benefit workers of
color.

314

IV. THINKING ABOUT SOLUTIONS
Building on the descriptive argument that existing disparate
treatment law features significant doctrinal asymmetries that
See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 675-77 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
312.
dissenting) (noting that as a result of the majority's decision permitting certain types of
affirmative action, a "statute [(Title VII)] designed to establish a color-blind and genderblind workplace has thus been converted into a powerful engine of racism and sexism, not
merely permitting intentional race- and sex-based discrimination, but often making it,
through operation of the legal system, practically compelled"); cf. Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240-41 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) ("[T]here is a moral [and] constitutional equivalence between laws designed
to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster
some current notion of equality." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Bass v. Bd. of
Cty. Comm'rs, 256 F.3d 1095, 1111 n.7 (11th Cir. 2001) ("The only thing to distinguish an
affirmative action plan from any other discriminatory statement (other than the degree of
formality involved) is that the discrimination it describes or prescribes is permissible if the
plan is valid under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. If it is not valid, an
affirmative action plan amounts to nothing more than a formal policy of unlawful
discrimination.").
See supranotes 109-14 and accompanying text.
313.
See Regents of Univ. of Cal v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.) ("I
314.
suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative-action program in a racially
neutral way and have it successful. To ask that this be so is to demand the impossible. In
order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And
in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot-we dare
not-let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy.").
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disfavor workers of color and favor the maintenance of racial
hierarchy in the workplace, this Part begins an argument-more
detailed development of which will have to occupy much more
space in future work-which suggests that "fixing" disparate
treatment law might have to take a different, or at least a
modified, approach to what has been proposed in some parts of the
employment discrimination literature.
As noted briefly in the Introduction, there is a broad
consensus that disparate treatment law is in disarray and is overly
harsh to plaintiffs, and thus various proposals for doctrinal reform
have been made. Rather than focusing on reducing asymmetry
that disfavors workers of color, however, such proposals have often
centered around reducing the complexity of existing doctrine, and
the evidentiary burdens that it places on plaintiffs. While scholars
have made strong cases in support of such proposals, I suggest that
in the particular context of race discrimination we ought to be
cautious of unintended consequences that could flow from strong
implementation of such proposals-consequences that may
further support the continued maintenance of racial hierarchy in
the American workplace. Instead, we ought to focus on reforms
that directly help to reduce doctrinal asymmetry and support
hierarchy attenuation.
Some proponents of the view that Title VII race
discrimination doctrine is (contrary to the claims made in this
Article) already largely symmetrical have argued that doctrinal
reform should make it even more symmetrical. This would involve,
for example, eliminating the "background circumstances" test
analyzed in Section HI.B.1 as inappropriately requiring white
plaintiffs and plaintiffs of color to meet different doctrinal
standards.3 15 As I have argued, however, viewed against the
backdrop of the asserted purpose of Title VII to eliminate racial
hierarchy in the American economy, this test is necessary to
provide equal doctrinal treatment to the claims of workers of color.
Equally important, the test is necessary to avoid the doctrinal
ossification of a baseline error that inappropriately eases the
burden of establishing a disparate treatment claim for white
reverse
discrimination plaintiffs who challenge racial
remediation-as happened in Ricci, for example. Such ossification
increases the risks and costs for, and thus reduces the likelihood
of, employers engaging in such remediation when it is profoundly
needed. Instead, a robust background circumstances test should
be applied to white reverse discrimination plaintiffs. This would
315.
See Schoenbaum, supra note 28, at 135-36 (arguing that an asymmetry in the
standards of proof may unfairly limit suits).
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have the added benefit of aiding a doctrinal push for a mandatory
finding of liability when a plaintiff proves a prima facie case and
discredits the employer's asserted reason(s) for a challenged
employment action. With a robust background circumstances
requirement, both workers of color and white workers would be
putting forth evidence in their prima facie cases that justifies an
inference of discrimination, which in turn is further strengthened
by having discredited the employer's rebuttal. This would provide
stronger support for a substantive, rather than merely a
procedural, reading of the prima facie case as suggested in Section
III.B.2. Thus, a universal and robust background circumstances
requirement for white reverse discrimination plaintiffs would be a
3 16
useful doctrinal reform.
Other scholars have proposed assisting employment
discrimination plaintiffs31 7 by reducing the causation burden that
(all) disparate treatment plaintiffs have to meet. Such proposals
generally call for a legal standard which requires plaintiff to prove
something less than but-for causation to establish liability, such
showing that is required in Title VII
as the "motivating factor"
"mixed motives" cases.3 18 Reducing the plaintiff's evidentiary
burden would make it easier for more plaintiffs to succeed,
especially if their cases are currently marginal. More specifically,
a lower causation burden would allow plaintiffs to succeed in
"overdetermined" cases in which there are multiple sufficient
reasons for a particular employment action (say the plaintiff s race
and his disciplinary history) but none of the reasons can be viewed
as a necessary "but for" cause. 19 Such proposals, too, however,
may have significant unintended consequences that could hinder

316.

The necessity of a universal background circumstances requirement may not be

as strong in the context of other protected characteristics. While this topic is beyond the
scope of this Article, Schoenbaum raises this possibility for age and certain sex
discrimination contexts. See id. at 136-37. I argue that at least in the context of race, for

which Schoenbaum acknowledges that some of the proposed benefits of greater symmetry
are weaker, pushing for such a requirement is clearly appropriate. See id. at 123.
Given space constraints, I do not address arguments for doctrinal changes that
317.
would make it more difficult for all plaintiffs to win their cases. Given the prominence of
plaintiffs of color in the disparate treatment context, such a requirement would be counter
to the framework proposed in this Article, which is concerned with inappropriate burdens
placed on workers of color by the status quo.
See, e.g., Katz, supra note 17, at 651-59; Katz, supra note 155, at 515-16, 531
318.
n.147; Corbett, supra note 17, at 107-08. Recall that under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff
must make the stricter showing of but-for causation. See generally supranotes 164-68 and
accompanying text.
319. As Professor Katz has noted, such overdetermined cases are likely to be more
common in employment discrimination cases than in other areas of the law. See Katz, supra
note 155, at 512-14.
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the elimination of racial hierarchy in the workplace.
This time, the problem is one of ideology. The argument that
"motivating factor" causation should always be sufficient to
establish liability is based on the notion that any consideration of
a protected characteristic in an employment decision is
inappropriate. As the Supreme Court noted in Price Waterhouse,
for example, under this view of causation the protected
characteristic "must be irrelevant to employment decisions" and
thus "may not be considered in making decisions" at all.3 20 In the
context of race, of course, this standard amounts to an extreme
commitment to procedural colorblindness. As I discussed in
Section III.B.3 above, however, this strict procedural view of
colorblindness has been the main ideological weapon wielded
against voluntary employer affirmative action programs. Indeed,
it is what drives the view that affirmative action ought to be
treated and policed as a very limited departure in favor of workers
of color from an otherwise symmetrical Title VII. For example, this
view underlies the decisions finding that an affirmative action
plan counts as "direct evidence" of unlawful intentional disparate
treatment unless the plan fits within the strict confines of existing
doctrine. As discussed in Section III.B.2, it also underlies the
"premise" in Ricci that the actions of the City of New Haven in
trying to avoid disparate impact against workers of color were
presumptively unlawful disparate treatment because race was
considered in the decision not to certify the test results.
Accordingly, implementing a universal "motivating factor"
procedural
on
double-down
standard
would
causation
colorblindness, magnify the perceived theoretical inconsistency
between a "traditional" disparate treatment doctrine that abhors
consideration of race and an affirmative action doctrine that
requires it to be effective, and put even greater pressure on those
asked to justify affirmative action programs viewed as a "special
exception." The plurality in Price Waterhouse avoided having to
answer this conundrum by simply carving affirmative action cases
321
out of the reach of the principles announced in the opinion.
However, it was promptly called out by Justice O'Connor's
concurrence and the dissent, 22 both of which argued that
"motivating factor" causation should be available to all plaintiffs,
323 Of
including those challenging affirmative action programs.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989).
Id. at 239 n.3.
Id. at 279 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id at 293 n.4 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
The 1991 Civil Rights Act also punted on answering this ideological problem by
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course, if a motivating factor standard were available to
affirmative action challengers, there could be no affirmative action
programs. The whole point of an affirmative action program is to
take the protected characteristic, including race, into account.
Thus, by definition, each decision taken pursuant to an affirmative
would involve "motivating factor" causation and
action program
324
liability.

This is not to say that there is no place for a lower causation
standard in disparate treatment doctrine. Given longstanding
racialized inequality in the American workplace, we should be
suspicious of employment decisions that even partially rely on race
to the disadvantage of workers of color. But in pushing for lower
evidentiary burdens for plaintiffs, we should avoid framing the
benefits of a lower causation burden in strong colorblind terms,
and instead emphasize how procedural colorblindness is the
ideological weapon to which those with an interest in maintaining
racial hierarchy turn when justifying their policy preferences. 2 5
The lower causation burden should be used only in "traditional"
disparate treatment cases, and only in the service of the statutory
purpose of eliminating racial hierarchy in the workplace. To
protect against baseline errors, white plaintiffs should have to
make a relevant background-circumstances showing before having
access to the standard.326 Affirmative action programs should not
be challengeable using motivating factor causation but instead be
made easier to implement. While there are complex factors to be
considered in this context, including those involving the dynamics
of SDO vis-a-vis different formulations of affirmative action
programs that require more detailed analysis, 27 and of
constitutional law,3 28 the framework laid out in this Article should

be helpful in proposing useful answers in that regard as well.
Finally, some commentators have urged a move away from
codifying motivating factor causation but noting that affirmative action plans "in

accordance with the law" are permissible. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166,
§ 116, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note).
324.
While there might be the same-decision defense to limit remedies, establishing
that defense necessitates showing the pointlessness of the program by proving that the
same decision could, and would, have been made without it. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

5(g)(2)(B).
325.
326.

See supra notes 109-14, 313-14 and accompanying text.
Contra Corbett, supra note 17, at 108-09.

See generally Geoffrey C. Ho & Miguel M. Unzueta, Antiegalitariana for
327.
Affirmative Action? When Social Dominance Orientationis PositivelyRelated to Support for
EgalitarianSocial Policies, 45 J. APPL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 451 (2015) (explaining how different
types of affirmative action programs weigh group membership differently in selection
decisions and how this weighing may affect judgments of people with varying SDO).

328.

See, e.g., Harris, supra note 39.
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proof structures towards evaluating a single determinative
question: based on all of the evidence, did the plaintiff succeed in
showing that it was more likely than not that the employer
intentionally discriminated against her because of a protected
characteristice s29 Here, too, while there is something to be said for
removing complexity from the legal inquiry (which may well be a
stumbling block for deserving plaintiffs), there is equal reason to
believe that such a simplified inquiry could be just as hard to meet
for workers of color.
For one, such a standard creates much greater discretion for
the finder of fact. As some of the implicit bias literature has shown,
decisions with greater amounts of discretion are notoriously prone
to be biased against people of colors Research grounded in SDT,
too, suggests that judges, many of whom we can suspect to have
relatively high levels of SDO, could be influenced in more
discretionary decision-making by skewed perceptions of existing
racial inequality and racial progress,331 or differential liking of
white discrimination claimants versus those of color.3 32 Thus, this
Article suggests that if courts were to accept this reform proposal,
their analysis should be firmly conscious of the possibility of
baseline errors and the hierarchy-relevant outcome of any
particular decision. Proof structures can be complicated, but if
properly calibrated based on a clear underlying purpose, they may
also constrain factfinders and judges who may otherwise be hostile
to discrimination claims and inclined to rule against them.3 3 3 A
McDonnell Douglas analysis grounded in the statutory purpose to
eliminate racial hierarchy in the workplace-with a robust
background circumstances requirement, a mandatory finding of
liability upon a prima facie -showing combined with discrediting
the employer's rebuttal, and a rejection or significant softening of
the various doctrinal rules at the pretext stage that derail most
disparate treatment cases-could serve such a function.
Ultimately, and in the longer term, perhaps the most effective
and lasting way to address the many hierarchy-enhancing aspects

329.
See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking DiscriminationLaw, 110 MICH. L. REV.
69,115-21 (2011); Timothy M. Tymkovich, The Problem with Pretext, 85 DENy. L. REV. 503,

528-29 (2008).
See, e.g., Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLAL. REV. 1124,
330.
1142-47(2012).

331.

See supra Section 11-4.

332.
333.

See supra Section III.B.3.
Cf. Malamud, supranote 158, at 2272-74 (contemplating the possibility that the

McDonnell Douglasframework may function to constrain hostile factfinders, but ultimately
rejecting that this should be its function).
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of current disparate treatment doctrine would be to push for a
judiciary that is more explicitly motivated to attenuate existing
racial hierarchy. As SDT research has shown, while the study of
law may increase people's SDO levels, being in an environment
with hierarchy-attenuating mores can decrease people's SDO
levels, and people choosing to work in those environments are
likely to have low levels of support for group-based hierarchy to
begin with.3 3 4 Public defenders, in particular, have been found to
have very low SDO levels. 3 3 There have been calls to diversify the
bench with more judges from what the framework of this Article
would likely consider to be hierarchy-attenuating positions, such
as public interest lawyers, public defenders, and certain lawyers
38 6
representing individual clients.
The framework and analysis provided in this Article suggest
that such efforts may indeed be productive steps that could help
address the current hostility of employment discrimination law
towards workers of color. Such an approach would be particularly
useful when combined with efforts to increase racial and gender
diversity on the bench, calls for which have also been made by
different groups. S 7 SDT research has consistently shown that
women and members of racial minorities have lower average levels
of SDO than white men. 338 Thus, a judiciary that combines racial
and gender diversity with experiential diversity in the practice of
law would likely be poised to act in ways, including crafting
judicial doctrines, that are more sensitive to the continued
subordination of workers of color in the American economy. Such
a judiciary, on the whole, might be able to turn the tide and bring
us closer to the goal of helping to eliminate racial hierarchy
through law than what we see today.
As I have briefly noted earlier, this is not an abstract
prediction. Judge characteristics, particularly race and gender,

334.
See supra Section 11A3.
335.
See, e.g., Jim Sidanius et al., Social Dominance Orientation, Hierarchy
Attenuators and HierarchyEnhancers:Social Dominance Theory and the CriminalJustice
System, 24 J. APPL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 338, 344-49 (1994).
336.
See, e.g., ALL. FOR JUSTICE, BROADENING THE BENCH: PROFESSIONAL DrvEEsrry
AND JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS 4 (2016) ("As this report details, the federal judiciary is
currently lacking in judges with experience (a) working for public interest organizations;
(b) as public defenders or indigent criminal defense attorneys; and (c) representing

individual clients-like employees, consumers, or personal injury plaintiffs-in private
practice."), https/www.a4.org/wp-content/uploads/2014111/Professional-Diversity-Repor
t.pdf [https'/perma.cc/7WS3-2TXN].

337. See, e.g., Weinberg & Nielsen, supra note 12, at 347-48; Chew & Kelley, supra
note 33, at 113-14.
338. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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have been found to influence the way in which judges decide
employment discrimination cases such that judges of color, and
particularly black judges, are much more likely to find in favor of
plaintiffs bringing race (and potentially also sex) discrimination
339
claims, even under the cramped doctrines that currently exist.
Female judges, too, have been found to be more likely to find for
plaintiffs, at least in the sex discrimination context.3 ° Importantly
for purposes of this Article, existing data suggests that female
judges and judges of color can influence appellate panels towards
more hierarchy-attenuating outcomes in certain circumstances,
even if they are in the minority on a panel.3 1 This is particularly
important in an area like federal employment discrimination law,
where statutory law is broad and vague, and much of the doctrine
results from judicial interpretation at the circuit court level. Thus,
while the data on judicial diversity and decision-making in
employment discrimination cases is neither perfect nor
unambiguous,m it supports the proposition that a framework like
that laid out in this Article, grounded in robust social psychological
research by SDT scholars, can help us both better understand and
explain judicial decision-making and evaluate the implications of
various proposals for change. It is particularly appropriate to
analyze federal employment discrimination law, and particularly
race discrimination law under Title VII, through a hierarchycentered lens given the Supreme Court's pronouncements about
the purposes underlying this area of the law. This Article makes a
start in this direction, hopefully with much more analysis in this
vein to come in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has looked to Social Dominance Theory-a
339.

See, e.g., supra note 126.

340.

For a review, see Pat K Chew, Judges' Gender and Employment Discrimination

Cases: Emerging Evidence-Based Empirical Conclusions, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 359,
366 (2011).
341.
See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 126, at 796 n.3; see also Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial

Diversity and JudicialInfluence on Appellate Courts, 57 AA. J. POL. SCi. 167, 171 (2013).
342.
For example, the intersectional effects of race and gender are comparatively
underexplored both in empirical research on judicial decision-making, see for example,

Boyd, supra note 126, at 795 (noting project's "inability to speak directly to the important
issue of intersectionality'; and in Social Dominance Theory, see for example, Pratto, supra
note 49, at 310 ("We need to know more about the relationships among age, gender, and
arbitrary-set inequality.. . ."); Lee, supra note 59, at 1047 (noting dificulty to investigate
gender-arbitrary set interaction based on existing research into SDO levels). Such research
is important in trying to better understand and explain research findings in some studies
showing that black judges are significantly more likely to find for plaintiffs in both race and

sex discrimination cases, while female judges were only significantly more likely to find for
plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases. See Boyd, supra note 126, at 793-94.
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prominent theory in social psychology with a robust body of
supporting empirical research-to question the view that Title VII
race discrimination doctrine is symmetrical, protecting all racial
groups equally except for those instances, most notably
affirmative action, that create limited preferences in favor of
workers of color. Digging deeper into the doctrinal logic, armed
with research findings on how judges are likely to act in hierarchyrelevant cases, this Article shows how current Title VII disparate
treatment doctrine is fundamentally asymmetrical to the
detriment of workers of color and maintains the racial hierarchy
that continues to pervade the American economy. Taking a
hierarchy-centered view helps us uncover unintended negative
consequences that may result from various law reform proposals
that have been suggested to address the harsh nature of current
law. This Article has provided initial suggestions for what reform
grounded in one of Title VH's main asserted purposes-to
eliminate racial hierarchy in the workplace--could look like. There
is much more to be said and analyzed in this context. But if we are
to move towards a more racially egalitarian society, we must be
conscious of, and challenge, the human tendency to perpetuate
group-based hierarchy at every step along the way.

